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CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
John H. Sturc*
Widespread resort to the federal courts to establish the constitutional rights
of prisoners was made possible by the Supreme Court's revival of the Civil
Rights Act of 18711 in Monroe v. Pape.2 Shortly thereafter, the Court
extended the protection of the Act to a state prisoner challenging the
conditions of his confinement, thereby enabling the prisoner to obtain
injunctive relief from the unconstitutional actions of his captors. 8
Beginning with litigation by Black Muslims demanding the opportunity to
worship in prison,4 federal courts have entertained a multitude of civil rights
actions in the past decade, often pressed by legal aid and public defender
organizations. 5 The increasing involvement of the federal courts in the daily
life of state and federal prisons has caused major developments in the
prisoners' rights field. 6 A variety of data evidences the impact. Correction-
* Law Clerk, United States District Court for the District of Maryland. A.B.,
1972, Cornell University; J.D., 1975, Harvard Law School.
The author wishes to thank Professor James Vorenberg of the Harvard Law School for
his guidance in the writing of this article, and Mrs. Patricia H. Johnston and Miss Jane
Knott for invaluable help in preparing it for publication.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any cit-
izen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
The jurisdictional counterpart to section 1983 is 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (3) (1970).
2. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The decision authorized a citizen to sue an officer of the
state in a federal forum for the deprivation of his federal constitutional rights under the
color of state law.
3. See Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
4. Id. See generally R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, AFTER CONVICTION 366-68 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as GOLDFARB & SINGER].
5. Such organizations as the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, the Legal Aid Society of
New York, and the ACLU National Prisoners' Rights Project have been in the forefront
of prisoners' litigation.
6. See generally GOLDFARB & SINGER 368; SOUTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS,
THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED 26-33 (1972); Cohen, The Discovery of
Prison Reform, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 855, 864 (1972); Paulsen, Prison Reform in the
Conditions of Confinement
al authorities in New York, Virginia and California have substantially
modified their disciplinary procedures because of pending federal litigation.7
At least four states have entered into consent decrees establishing detailed
rules and regulations for the conduct of prison discipline,8 and at least five
other states and the United States Bureau of Prisons have inaugurated prison
grievance programs with the hope of forestalling future complaints.9 Federal
courts in Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma and Vir-
ginia have found conditions so deficient as to require massive injunctive
relief and have maintained continuing scrutiny of these state correctional
systems. 10 Perhaps the best measure of the effect of federal litigation is the
response of inmates themselves. While habeas corpus petitions challenging
the legality of convictions have declined significantly over the past five years,
civil rights complaints have grown to a point at which they comprise nearly
17 percent of all civil actions in the federal district courts. 1'
Future-The Trend Toward Expansion of Prisoner's Rights, 16 VILL. L. REv. 1082
(1971).
7. See Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 130 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 885 (1972); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 631 (1971), enforced, 354 F.
Supp. 1292, supplemented, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973); Vanderet, Procedural
Due Process in California Prisons: A Comparitive [sic] Look at the New Directors, 48
CALIF. ST. B.J. 668, 673 (1973).
8. See Frazier v. Donelon, 381 F. Supp. 911, 920 (E.D. La. 1974) (establishing
access to religious services, public telephones, grievance procedures, and visiting privi-
leges in the Jefferson Parish Prison); Goldsby v. Carnes, 365 F. Supp. 395, 401 (W.D.
Mo. 1973) (providing for minimum sanitary conditions, daily diet, law library, health
care, visiting privileges, and other measures in the Jackson County Jail); Inmate 24394
v. Schoen, 363 F. Supp. 683 (D. Minn. 1973) (outlining disciplinary and grievance
procedures for the Minnesota prison system); Williams v. Wainwright, 350 F. Supp. 33
(M.D. Fla. 1972) (limiting the use of "strip cells" in the Florida State Prison at
Raiford); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (1970), enforced, 373 F. Supp.
177 (D.R.I. 1974) (providing for disciplinary and classification procedures at the Rhode
Island Adult Correctional Institution).
9. Maryland, Oregon, Kansas, Wisconsin, Illinois and Minnesota have begun system-
wide grievance mechanisms. NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, PRISON GRIEV-
A lcE PROCEDURES 6-15 (1974). The United States Bureau of Prisons' administrative
remedy procedure is detailed in Policy Statement 2001.6 (Feb. 14, 1974), reprinted in
Thompson v. United States, Federal Prison Indus., 492 F.2d 1082, 1085-87 (5th Cir.
1974).
10. See Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974); Landman v. Roy-
ster, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (1973), enforcing 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971);
Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp.
881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974), enforced, 390 F. Supp.
482 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afrd,
503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971), enforced sub nom.
Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub
nom. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
11. Habeas corpus and other prisoner petitions constituted 16.9 percent of all civil
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Among the rights which have received protection in the federal courts are
the inmate's right to free exercise of religion, correspondence, access to
counsel and the courts, adequate health care and housing, freedom from
inmate and guard assaults, participation in decisions which affect the life
of the inmate, ,and freedom from cruel and unusual -punishment.12 Because of
the extensive literature on this subject, this article will be confined to a
discussion of inmate participation in prison decisionmaking as guaranteed by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and substantive limita-
tions on the treatment of inmates under the eighth amendment. These two
areas appear to have the greatest impact on the daily life of the average
inmate.
I. FEDERALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
A. The Prisoner's Right to be Heard by Institutional Decisionmakers
An inmate confined in a "total institution", 1 where all of his daily
activities and perceptions are controlled by the correctional authorities, finds
all aspects of his life regulated by committees of the prison staff, from his
work and the type of cell in which he lives to the types of programs in which
he can participate. 14 Two administrative decisions are of particular impor-
tance within the prison: classification and discipline.
Upon arrival at most prisons, an inmate is held in an intake center where
he is given a battery of educational and psychological tests and oriented to
the rules and procedures of the institution. After a few weeks, he is brought
before the classification committee, usually the highest decisionmaking body
in the institution and composed of high ranking members of the prison
cases commenced in federal district courts during fiscal year 1972. The number of
petitions increased 690.9 percent between 1960 and 1973. 1973 ADMIN. OFFICE OF
U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 129-32.
12. For good, albeit dated, surveys, see GOLDFARB & SINGER; SOUTH CAROLINA DEP'T
OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 6; S. KRANTZ, THE LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS'
RIGHTS (1973).
13. See Goffman, On the Characteristics of Total Institutions, in THE PRISON 15, 100
(D. Cressey ed. 1961).
14. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit described the growing
administrative control over an inmate's life in Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280 (Ist
Cir. 1973), vacated, 418 U.S. 908 (1974), in which it noted:
As the correctional facility adds new rehabilitative programs and activities, ad-
ministrative discretion becomes broader. The correctional officer or adminis-
trator can, in some cases, decide upon various degrees of custody within the
same category of classification; he can offer schooling, jobs, and training pro-
grams (or decide not to offer them); he can grant furloughs, work-release,
school release, weekend release (or stop granting them); he can provide the in-
mate with an interesting and relatively lucrative job assignment or a poor one.
487 F.2d at 1286 n.16.
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staff. 1' Relying upon reports compiled during the orientation period concern-
ing the inmate's background, his education, the type of crime he committed,
and any prior institutional record, the committee usually speaks to the
inmate for up to half an hour and then informs him of his security
classification,1 his work assignment, and his treatment program (counseling
and/or psychological or psychiatric treatment, if any). A prisoner can be
reclassified at any time if his initial program is not satisfactory, and all
inmates appear before the classification committee for review at intervals
ranging from 90 days to one year. 17 Classification committees also have the
power to transfer an inmate from one institution to another, to grant
furloughs, and to grant additional good time when allowed by state or federal
law.' 8 Apart from any effect these decisions may have on the inmate's
rehabilitation, their impact on his daily life is profound. Jobs within the
institution have different rates of pay and may or may not teach skills which
will be useful outside the prison. Prisoners placed in higher degrees of
custody are afforded fewer privileges and are unlikely to be allowed to leave
the prison for employment, education, medical treatment, or family visits. 19
Despite the importance of the decision of the classification committee, the
results of some studies suggest that these proceedings are superficial and very
often based on inaccurate information. 20 Heavy reliance is placed on the
15. See Gifis, Decisionmaking in a Prison Community, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 349, 360-
65 (study of Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord conducted in 1969)
[hereinafter cited as Gifis]; Sirico, Prisoner Classification and Administrative Decision-
making, 50 TExAs L. REV. 1229 (1972) (Federal Correctional Institution at Texarkana)
[hereinafter cited as Sirico]; Note, California Department of Corrections and Adult Au-
thority Decisionmaking Procedures for Male Felons, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1353, 1355-59
(1974) [hereinafter cited as STAN. L. REV. Note]. Delaware procedure is similar. See
Jordon v. Keve, 387 F. Supp. 765, 768-69 (D. Del. 1974).
16. Different prisons and prison systems have varying levels of custody. California,
for example, has five: maximum, close, medium, minimum, and camps. STAN. L. REV.
Note 1356 n.14.
17. The Texarkana Prison officials review the program of each inmate every 90 to
120 days. Sirico 1240. California officials review classifications every six to twelve
months with lesser periods for those inmates held in segregation or maximum security.
STAN. L. REV. Note 1357. And the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Concord
reviews classifications at least once a year. Gifis 365.
18. See Sirico 1240-41. Good time is a statutory credit for a number of days off the
inmate's maximum sentence for each month he observes prison rules and/or performs
other meritorious actions, such as the donation of blood. Most states provide for
statutory good time which can be forfeited for serious misconduct. Fitch & Tepper,
Structuring Correctional Decision Making: A Traditional Proposal, 22 CATH. U.L. REV.
774, 779 (1973). In the federal system, 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (1970) provides automatic
good time for satisfactory behavior, and 18 U.S.C. § 4162 (1970) provides additional
discretionary good time allowances for especially meritorious behavior.
19. See Gifis 376; Sirico 1233.
20. In his study, Sirico commented that "[tireatment efforts ...suffer from a lack
1975]
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inmate's central file, which is considered confidential and not open to the
inmate for his inspection. 2 1 The inmate's input at the committee meeting is
limited. In one study of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Con-
cord (MCI, Concord), researchers found that the committee usually made
up its mind before the inmate's arrival. 22 Observers have also posited that
despite the rehabilitative rhetoric of classification, decisions are based as
much upon the manpower needs and space resources of the institution as
upon the inmate's individual requirements. 23 This is not to say, however,
that classification is totally ineffective for rehabilitation purposes. Courts
have generally accepted the need to establish a system of rewards to
encourage desirable behavior, 24 and several have ordered prison authorities
to inaugurate classification systems in order to separate violent inmates from
those who are more peaceful or vulnerable.
25
Next to classification, decisions regarding disciplinary action for violation
of prison rules are of the greatest importance for inmates, and procedures for
of means to measure the inmate's positive improvement." Sirico 1241. Gifis noted that
"[tlhe atmosphere of the hearing is more than informal; it appears a bit careless to an
observer." Gifis 368. Speaking more generally, Norval Morris has disparaged the
predictive value of parole and prison decisions. N. MoRis, ThE FUTURE OF IMPROVE-
MENT 31-43 (1974).
21. Both Sirico and Gifis noted the importance of the file and of the comments of the
inmate's work supervisor. California policy requires that prior to the entry of any
document "which may serve as the basis for a critical decision" into an inmate's file, he
be interviewed by a staff member and receive a copy of the interview summary. Cal.
Dep't of Corrections, Ad. Bull. No. 73/50, Oct. 23, 1973, at 2, quoted in STAN. L. REV.
Note 1357 n.20. California inmates are not, however, allowed access to psychiatric or
psychological evaluations or the cumulative case summary of the inmate. STAN. L. REV.
Note 1357 n.20. Gifis speculates that files are not open to inmates because the files
contain confidential information which could not be economically separated from non-
confidential information. Gifis 364.
22. See Gifis 364-65.
23. Sirico found that the Texarkana treatment team "receives a weekly list of the
institution's job vacancies and simply fills the work slots with new inmates. Since
experienced inmates find food service and laundry detail unattractive, they snap up other
employment openings and leave their old jobs to newcomers." Sirico 1236. Practice at
MCI, Concord is similar. Gifis 366. Many prisoners are dependent on inmate labor to
perform maintenance functions. G. SYKES, THE SOcIETY OF CAPTIVES 26 (1958).
24. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 190-91 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1390 (D.
Del. 1974); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1078 (M.D. Fla.), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973).
25. See Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (1973), enforcing 333 F. Supp. 621
(E.D. Va. 1971); Gates v Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 902 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd,
501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974), enforced, 390 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Holt v.
Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 384 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971),
enforced sub nom. Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir.
1974); accord, McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir. 1975).
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the imposition of disciplinary sanctions have been the subject of much
litigation and comment. The extent of the problem is revealed by data from
the nation's two largest prison populations. During 1973, the United States
Bureau of Prisons, with a population of about 23,000 during fiscal year
1973, conducted -approximately 19,000 diciplinary hearings;2 6 California
prisons, with a population of 22,486 in 1973, held 20,490 hearings. 27 Such
figures reflect the number of formal hearings, but the number of occasions
for the imposition of discipline is actually much higher since both systems
encourage informal resolution of minor complaints.
28
Correctional authorities consider disciplinary proceedings to be of the
highest importance both for the security of the prison 29 and as a tool for
aiding the rehabilitation process by helping ". . . to develop self-reliance,
self-control, self-respect and self-discipline." 30 Acts which constitute viola-
tions of disciplinary rules range from mere possession of instant coffee to
murder.31 One study of federal prisons at Texarkana and Leavenworth
indicated that the five most common violations presented to the disciplinary
committee were fighting, possession of contraband materials, refusal to work,
insolence toward a correctional officer or staff member, and presence in an
unauthorized area.32 Similarly, a 1972 study of discipline at the Rhode
Island Adult Correctional Institution found that trouble with a guard or other
staff, fighting, and refusal to obey orders constituted 55 percent of all
infractions.8
8
26. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Brief].
27. Brief for the State of California as Amicus Curiae, Exhibit 2 at iii, Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) [hereinafter cited as California Brief].
28. Federal practices at Texarkana and Leavenworth are described in Kraft, Prison
Disciplinary Practices and Procedures: Is Due Process Provided?, 47 N.D.L. REv. 9
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Kraft]. See STAN. L. REV. Note 1360.
29. The role of disciplinary proceedings in maintaining the security of the institution
is described by the state of California in its brief in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974): "The summary disposition of rules infractions is essential to the identification
and isolation of potential problems. The major problem can be prevented by prompt and
certain response to the minor infraction." California Brief 9. The position that summary
punishment can have a deterrent effect draws some support from psychological studies.
See, e.g., Singer, Psychological Studies of Punishment, 58 CALIF. L. Rav. 405 (1970).
30. U.S. Brief 27. Similar sentiments were expressed by Massachusetts authorities.
Gifis 402. Kraft has written that " . . . discipline, as viewed by correctional people,
involves for them much more than merely the policing of inmate's activities. Correctional
officers are also counselors, and their effectiveness as officers is measured largely by how
effective they are in their role as a counselor." Kraft 25.
31. See Gifis 388.
32. Kraft 33-35.
33. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, Judicial Intervention in Prison Discipline,
63 J. CIM. L.C. & P.S. 200, 212 (1972).
1975]
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Most prison administrations encourage the resolution of disciplinary in-
fractions at the lowest possible level. Guards are usually allowed summary
punitive powers such as confinement to the cell for a day or withdrawal of
movie privileges for minor infractions.a 4 A breach of the criminal law (e.g.,
escape, assault on a guard, possession of drugs and weapons) may be
referred to prosecutors, although the standards for such referrals are not
precise.35 All other violations are adjudicated by prison disciplinary commit-
tees.
Types of punishment which can be imposed by the disciplinary board tend
to fall into four basic categories: warning and reprimand, withdrawal of
privileges, solitary confinement, and loss of accrued good time. In the federal
system, extra work may be demanded of the inmate.30 Virtually all prison
systems provide for confinement of an inmate in solitary quarters for various
lengths of time and for the revocation of both accrued and pending good
time, 7 although these two penalties are usually reserved for serious offenses
or petty offenses committed by chronic inmates.38 Solitary confinement is
also imposed in varying forms and gradations.39 The most severe regime
which has survived judicial scrutiny under the eighth amendment is in Texas,
where an inmate may be confined for a period of up to 15 days in a cell
without windows or light of any kind while being allowed to wear only a loose
fitting gown.
40
34. See Kraft 26, 30. The policies of the Texas Department of Corrections are set
forth in Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968
(1972).
35. See Gifis 385; Kraft 49. In California, all felonies must be reported to the district
attorney. STAN. L. REV. Note 1361.
36. See Kraft 47.
37. Fitch & Tepper, supra note 18, at 778-79.
38. The Rhode Island study found a strong correlation between the offenses of
trouble with guards, fighting, refusal to obey orders and possession of alcohol and drugs
and either segregation or loss of good time. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra
note 33, at 217, Table 5. The findings of Gifis and Kraft are to the same effect. See
Gifis 405-08; Kraft 33-37.
39. The least onerous confinement is "padlocking", in which the offender is ordered
to his cell for a few days except for short periods of time. Most punitive segregation
requires that the inmate be removed from his regular cell and placed in a room with
minimal furniture in a wing of the prison reserved for rule violators. Gifis 384-85.
Punitive isolation cells range in comfort from ordinary prison cells to smaller cells
without natural light, see, e.g., Watkins v. Johnson, 375 F. Supp. 1005, 1010 (E.D. Pa.
1974), without sheets and pillows, see, e.g., Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 666 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972), with limited exercise privileges, see, e.g.,
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 1971), with restricted use of showers,
see, e.g., Clements v. Turner, 364 F. Supp. 270, 274 (D. Utah 1973), and in the absence
of all intellectual stimulation, see, e.g., Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1390
(D. Del. 1973).




Studies of prison discipline indicate that segregation and forfeiture of good
time are common punishments. A 1969 survey of MCI, Concord showed
that 55 percent of all charges investigated resulted in some time in segrega-
tion.41 During a similar time span, 30 percent of all dispositions in Rhode
Island ended in some form of segregation and another 15 percent in the loss
of good time.42 A survey of practices in the federal prisons at Texarkana and
Leavenworth indicated that segregation was imposed in 42 percent and 32
percent of all cases respectively, and good time was withheld in 51 percent
and 44 percent of all cases, respectively. 43 Regardless of the disciplinary
disposition, the report of the infraction becomes a part of the inmate's
permanent file with serious collateral consequences. Because his record
before the disciplinary committee is considered indicative of the inmate's
ability to adjust to life in the institution and his general level of antisocial
conduct, it is an important factor in determining his security classification,
prison employment, and his chances for furlough and parole.
44
Disciplinary hearings themselves are a new phenomenon. 45 Summary
confinement and corporal punishment were imposed by lower echelon guards
in such states as Arkansas, Mississippi and Virginia until the 1970's.46 Such
hearings as existed were quite crude. For example, until 1969, inmates in
Massachusetts were not provided with any rules and regulations by which to
guide their conduct. A proceeding was initiated by the written report of a
correctional officer. The inmate in question was brought before the discipli-
nary board, where the chairman of the three-person committee read
the contents of the written report aloud. If the prisoner denied his guilt, he
had to persuade the committee of his innocence without the benefit of an
advocate, without confrontation and cross-examination of his accuser, and
without the ability to call witnesses on his own behalf.
47
41. Gifis 408. In Massachusetts, forfeiture of three days good time follows automati-
cally for each day spent in isolation. Id. at 384.
42. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra note 33, at 216.
43. Kraft 37.
44. Gifis 385; Kraft 40.
45. "Until recently, discipline was frequently meted out in a prompt and arbitrary
fashion, at the location of the infraction or after the offender received a pro forma 'write
up.'" U.S. Brief 5a.
46. See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), alf'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971), enforced sub nom. Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194
(8th Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d
1291 (5th Cir. 1974), enforced, 390 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Landman v.
Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (1973), enforcing 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971).
47. Gifis 390. The system in Pennsylvania, described in United States ex rel. Jones v.
Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 942 (E.D. Pa. 1973), is substantially the same.
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Disciplinary proceedings began to change form rapidly after inmate
success in early due process cases such as Morris v. Travisono,48 Sostre v.
Rockefeller,49 Bundy v. Cannon,5° Cluchette v. Procunier,5' and Landman
v. Royster.52 The United States Bureau of Prisons, which had inaugurated
disciplinary hearings in 1954 and substantially revised its policies in 1971
and 1972,58 now uses a two-tiered disciplinary system. For lesser violations,
an officer writes a misconduct report which is referred to the Adjustment
Committee. A staff investigator interviews witnesses and presents the ac-
cused inmate with written notification of the charges against him. The matter
is then brought before the Adjustment Committee, which meets at least three
times a week. The Committee advises the inmate of the charges and asks
him for his account of the incident. It may call witnesses on its own motion
or on the request of the inmate, but it does not allow cross-examination or
disclose all of the evidence compiled by the investigation. Upon reaching a
decision, the Committee must make written findings of fact and an explana-
tion of its disposition. The inmate receives a written summary of these find-
ings, but the summary may not include the substance of confidential informa-
tion relied upon by the Committee. 54 Sanctions available to the Committee
include changing the inmate's job or housing, withholding privileges, or im-
posing segregation.
If the charges are very serious, then the matter is referred to the Good
Time Forfeiture Board.55 In practice, proceedings before the Adjustment
Committee are quite informal. 56 Proceedings before the Good Time Forfeiture
Board are much more structured. If the inmate denies the charges against
him, he is allowed the assistance of a staff member to aid in the preparation
48. 310 F. Supp. 857 (1970), enforced, 373 F. Supp. 177 (D.R.I. 1974).
49. 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub. nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
50. 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971).
51. 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971), affd as modified, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.
1974), modified and remanded, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975).
52. 333 F. Supp. 621 (1971), enforced, 354 F. Supp. 1292, supplemented, 354 F.
Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973).
53. See U.S. Brief 8a, 1la. Federal policies for inmate discipline other than the loss
of good time may be found in Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 74.005B, June 6, 1972,
and for forfeiture of good time in Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 7400.6A, Aug. 13,
1971.
54. U.S. Brief 14a-15a & n.13.
55. U.S. Brief 16a-17a.
56. See, e.g., Walker v. Hughes, 375 F. Supp. 708, 714 (E.D. Mich. 1974), super-
seded, 386 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Mich. 1974), describing the proceeding for the Federal
Youth Center at Milan, Michigan.
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of a defense. The Board calls witnesses to testify rather than relying on the
staff investigation alone. Although the Board may refuse to hear some de-
fense witnesses if the testimony offered is repetitive or irrelevant, it must note
the reason for the refusal on the record of the proceeding. The inmate is not
permitted to cross-examine and may be prohibited from seeing confidential
information. The Board makes a detailed record of the hearing, and makes
findings of fact and recommendations which are then submitted to the chief
executive officer of the institution for decision. Copies of the report are given
to the inmate and sent to the Office of General Counsel and Review of the
Bureau of Prisons.5
7
In a survey of prison disciplinary practices conducted in early 1974, just
prior to the Supreme Court decision of Wolff v. McDonnell,58 the systems
responding to inquiries stated that they distributed written rules and regula-
tions regarding conduct to the inmates and held hearings at which an
accused could hear the evidence against him and make a statement on his
own behalf. Ninety percent stated that they gave an inmate advance notice
of the hearing, made some form of written record of the proceedings, and
allowed some form of appeal. Relatively few institutions allowed cross-
examination of adverse witnesses by the accused inmate or his representative,
and fewer still allowed representation by retained counsel.59 The findings of
the survey were not verified, however, and are of dubious accuracy.60
B. Wolff v. McDonnell-Due Process Rights
,Following the Supreme Court's holding in Goldberg v. Kelly6' that due
process rights under the fourteenth amendment attach to the termination
of welfare benefits and the extension of this doctrine to parole 2 and
probation revocation proceedings,63 prison disciplinary proceedings were
challenged across the nation; this led to a spate of district court decisions and
seven circuit court holdings, many of them inconsistent. 64 The Supreme
57. U.S. Brief 16a-20a. The constitutionality of the Good Time Forfeiture Board was
upheld in Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1974).
58. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
59. ABA RESOURCE CENTER ON CORRECTIONAL LAW AND LEGAL SERVICES, SURVEY OF
PRISON DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES 9-11 (1974).
60. Id. at 7.
61. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
62. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
63. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
64. E.g., Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), modified and
remanded, 510 F.2d 613, cert. granted sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct.
2414 (1975); Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1974); Palmigiano v. Bax-
ter, 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated, 418 U.S. 908 (1974); Braxton v. Carlson,
483 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1973); McDonnell v. Wolff, 483 F.2d 1059 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1146 (1974); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Court decided the issue in Wolff v. McDonnell,65 a suit seeking the
restoration of good time lost in a disciplinary proceeding.
At the outset, the majority opinion by Justice White stated unequivocally
that prisoners were protected by the due process clause. This protection
attached to disciplinary hearings in which good time was forfeited because
the Nebraska statutory scheme awarded good time credit as a right subject to
revocation for major misconduct. °6 Having been granted good time, the
inmate acquired an interest in its preservation as a part of his liberty which
could not be extinguished without some form of a hearing.6 7 In determining
the weight to be given this interest, however, the Court was very restrictive,
and concluded that it was less important than that of the probationer or pa-
rolee facing revocation of his conditional liberty.6s Conversely, the Court
found the state's interest in the preservation of internal security in the institu-
tion and in the rehabilitation of the inmate to be of the utmost gravity. It
therefore refused to encase ". . . the disciplinary procedures in an inflexible
constitutional straitjacket that would necessarily call for adversary proceed-
ings typical of the criminal trial ....
The Wolff Court held that minimum due process requires an absolute
right to written notice of the charges at least 24 hours in advance of the
hearing so that the inmate can prepare his defense,70 as well as a "'written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons' for the
disciplinary action" 7' in order to protect the inmate in subsequent transfer
and parole decisions and to prevent arbitrary action. Sensitive evidence was
allowed to be omitted from the record, but the Court noted that the record
should reflect the fact of the deletion. 72 Inmates were given the right to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence on their own behalf, subject to
limitations of time and institutional security,78 but no right to cross-examine
65. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
66. Id. at 557.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 561.
69. Id. at 563.
70. Id. at 564.
71. Id., quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
72. 418 U.S. at 565.
73. The Court supported this balancing by noting:
Prison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within
reasonable limits and to refuse to call witnesses that may create a risk of repri-
sal or undermine authority, as well as to limit access to other inmates to col-
lect statements or to compile other documentary evidence. Although we do
not prescribe it, it would be useful for the Committee to state its reason for re-
fusing to call a witness, whether it be for irrelevance, lack of necessity, or the
hazards presented in individual cases.
Id. at 566.
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adverse witnesses because of the potential for reprisal against inmate-
witnesses. 74 An inmate does not have the right to counsel or counsel
substitute unless he is illiterate or "the complexity of the issue makes it
unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence
necessary for an adequate comprehension of the case." 75 In that event, he
may have the assistance of a staff member or a "sufficiently competent
inmate" selected by the authorities.76 Finally, the majority concluded that a
disciplinary board composed of senior corrections personnel did not risk
"such a hazard of arbitrary decisionmaking that it should be held violative of
due process of law."
' 77
Wolff disappointed prisoners' rights advocates and has been bitterly
criticized for failing to extend the same tests of fundamental liberties as are
applied in other areas. 78 Others dispute the Court's assumption that a full
adversary hearing would undermine prison administration. 79 Earlier circuit
court opinions afforded inmates the right to cross-examine their accusers °
74. Id. at 567-69.
75. Id. at 570. The Court declined to hold that "inmates have a right to either
retained or appointed counsel in disciplinary proceedings." Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 571. The Adjustment Committee involved in Wolff was composed of the
Associate Warden for Custody, the Correctional Industries Superintendant and the
Reception Director. There was no allegation that any of the three had a personal
involvement in the incident which led to McDonnell's appearance before the committee.
78. See, e.g., the opinion of Judge James P. Doyle in Taylor v. Schmidt, 380 F. Supp.
1222 (W.D. Wis. 1974):
I regret that . . . the court failed to search more deeply into, and to deal
more precisely with, what I consider the profound federal constitutional issues
implicated in the prison system. . . . I appreciate the reasons why the courts
have thought it wise to go slow until the implications of constitutional rulings
in the field of corrections can be more clearly discerned .... But similar dif-
ficulty attends the development of constitutional doctrine in other areas. If it
is determined ultimately that prisoners do indeed enjoy certain federal constitu-
tional rights which are not being recognized by correctional officials, it will be-
come clear that for an extended period the courts have failed to make the con-
stitution a living document for many human beings.
id. at 1231.
79. One district court doubted the substance of the intimidation argument. Murphy v.
Wheaton, 381 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ill. 1974). Noting that most prison incidents are
observed by only a few persons, the court reasoned that an inmate could either infer the
identity of the informant from the record or learn his name through the prison
grapevine. "Protection against possible retaliation requires more than non-confrontation
while its denial may well result in injustice." Id. at 1258.
80. See Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), modified and
remanded, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S.
Ct. 2414 (1975); Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated, 418
U.S. 908 (1974). See also Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521 (M.D. Tenn. 1974);
Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Collins v. Hancock, 354 F.
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and the right to a counsel substitute.8 ' Indeed, most expert recommendations
regarding prison discipline have urged provision of a greater panoply of safe-
guards.8 2 Also, several prison systems allow inmates rights beyond those
granted in Wolff. 83
II. DIscIPLINARY HEARINGS AFTER Wolff
A. Sanctions Requiring Due Process
Wolff left as many issues regarding discipline unanswered as it attempted
to resolve. First, it is not clear how far due process protections extend or
whether the protections are fewer for lesser sanctions. In an oft-quoted
footnote, the majority stated that the same protections should extend to
proceedings which might lead to solitary confinement, but not to deprivation
of lesser privileges. 84 While earlier lower court decisions are in accord with
Supp. 1253 (D.N.H. 1973); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla.),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973); Colligan v.
United States, 349 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
81. Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280 (lst Cir. 1973), vacated, 418 U.S. 908
(1974).
82. See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, A MODEL ACT FOR
THE PROTECTION OF Riowrs OF PRISONERS § 4 (1972). The Model Act, proposed by the
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, calls for the right to be represented by
counsel or counsel substitute chosen by the accused. See also CENTER FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, MODEL RULES AND REGULATIONS ON
PRISONERS' RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1973). The Model Rules and Regulations
advocate a hearing board chaired by a person from outside the corrections system, the
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, representation by counsel substitute of the in-
mate's choice in all hearings and by counsel for major offenses, an appeal to the super-
intendent of the institution from the hearing board based on the evidence presented at
the hearing, and limits on the use of confidential testimony.
83. See, e.g., Rules for the Treatment of Inmates in Delaware Correctional Institu-
tions, Articles 24-26, reprinted in Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1396-97 (D.
Del. 1973), which provide for the right to cross-examine, to compel attendance of up to
five witnesses, and to counsel or counsel substitute when the offense charged is also a
violation of state criminal law.
84. 418 U.S. at 571-72 n.19. The Court analyzed the rights in question and stated:
• . . it would be difficult for purposes of procedural due process to distinguish
between the procedures that are required when good time is forfeited and those
that must be extended when solitary confinement is at issue. The latter repre-
sents a major change in the conditions of confinement and is normally im-
posed only when it is claimed and proved that there has been a major act of
misconduct. Here, as in the case of good time, these should be minimum pro-
cedural safeguards as a hedge against arbitrary determination of the factual
predicate for imposition of the sanction. We do not suggest, however, that the
procedures required by today's decision . . . would also be required for the im-
position of lesser penalties such as the loss of privileges.
Id. See also the discussion of this footnote in Justice Marshall's dissent, 418 U.S. at 581
n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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this line of demarcation,8" it presents an analytical difficulty since most
disciplinary committees are empowered to withdraw good time, impose solitary
confinement, and/or suspend privileges.8 6 Two courts have solved this prob-
lem by holding that the protections attach at any time that an inmate risks
either solitary confinement or the loss of good time.8 7 Such an interpretation,
however, would appear to make both the California and federal disciplinary
procedures unconstitutional since both allow solitary confinement to be
imposed without Wolff safeguards.88 Second, while the segregation at issue
in Wolff was confinement in a punitive isolation cell with limited privileges,
the Court did not reach the issue of different degrees of isolation.89 Inmates
are often held in custody denominated "administrative" segregation, nominal-
ly for purposes of protection, but occasionally for purposes of punishment.90
Those lower courts which have reached the issue have unanimously held that
when the confinement is for purposes of punishment, the label of the cell is
irrelevant and due process rights attach.9 1
85. See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 654 (E.D. Va. 1971), enforced,
354 F. Supp. 1292, supplemented, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973), in which Judge
Merhige held that full due process was not required when imposition of small fines, loss
of commissary rights, restriction of recreation privileges, or confinement in one's own
cell were at issue.
86. See notes 48-57 & accompanying text supra.
87. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1318 (5th Cir. 1974); Murphy v. Wheaton, 381
F. Supp. 1252, 1255 (N.D. Mll. 1974).
88. The Bureau of Prisons' Adjustment Committee does not provide for counsel
substitute in any form and severely limits the inmate's right to call witnesses. See notes
53-57 & accompanying text supra. California relies on the testimony elicited by an
independent investigator rather than on pro se examination and cross-examination by the
accused inmate. See Vanderet, Procedural Due Process in California Prisons: A Compar-
itive (sic] Look at the New Directors, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 668, 674, 738 (1974).
89. The Court noted that the regulations of the Nebraska Prison Authority allow
segregation:
a. To insure immediate control and supervision.
b. To protect potential victims.
c. To insure witnesses against intimidation.
e. To control those whose emotions are out of control.
f. To insure their safety or the safety of others.
418 U.S. at 558 n.8, quoting regulations promulgated by the Nebraska prison authorities.
90. See, e.g., Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521, 528-29 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
91. See Daigle v. Hall, 387 F. Supp. 652 (D. Mass. 1975); Diamond v. Thompson,
364 F. Supp. 659, 664 (M.D. Ala. 1973). See also Fife v. Crist, 380 F. Supp. 901, 905
(D. Mont. 1974); Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521 (M.D, Tenn. 1974). Model Rule
VI-6, promulgated by the Center for Criminal Justice at Boston University, allows
administrative confinement only for the protection of the inmate in question. CENTER
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BOSTON UNIVERSrrY SCHOOL OF LAW, supra note 82.
1975]
Catholic University Law Review
B. Written Rules of Behavior
The need for written rules of conduct and specified penalties for infrac-
tions was not discussed by the Wolff court.9 2 Numerous courts, however,
support the position that "the existence of some reasonably definite rule is a
prerequisite to prison discipline of any substantial sort,19 3 and required by
the due process clause,94 despite the arguments of correctional administra-
tors that such a requirement would leave them unable to punish unforeseen
but clearly detrimental conduct.9 5
C. Conduct of the Hearing
Because Wolff left many issues to the discretion of correctional personnel,
litigation concerning the content of the hearing has continued, focusing on
five problems: the right to call witnesses, confrontation and cross-examina-
tion of adverse witnesses, the right to lay counsel, the amount of detail in
the permanent record, and the impartiality of the decisionmaker9 6 The
92. The Court noted that the Nebraska regulations state that "[tlhe institution
population will be kept informed through the orientation process and by written orders
and memorandums [sic] as to the standards of conduct expected." 418 U.S. at 548 n.8.
One district court expressed the opinion that "[p]risoners have a right to know the
scope of punishment possible for infractions" and the lack of such guidelines could lead
to equal protection problems. Collins v. Vitek, 375 F. Supp. 856, 862 (D.N.H. 1974).
The Center for Criminal Justice's proposed rules, see note 82 supra, endorse adoption
of detailed schedules of rules and penalties with each inmate receiving a copy of such
rules.
93. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 656 (E.D. Va. 1971), enforced, 354 F.
Supp. 1292, supplemented, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973).
94. See United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'g
364 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D.N.Y. 1973); United States ex rel. Haymes v. Montanye, 505
F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1974); Daigle v. Hall, 387 F. Supp. 652, 660 (D. Mass. 1975); Battle
v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 421 (E.D. Okla. 1974); Collins v. Vitek, 375 F. Supp.
856 (D.N.H. 1974); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1090 (M.D. Fla.), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973); Gates v. Collier, 349 F.
Supp. 881, 895 (N.D. Miss. 1972), afl'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Landman v.
Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (1971), enforced, 354 F. Supp. 1292, supplemented,
354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973). Larkins, Daigle and Gates all require that the notice
of the disciplinary infraction given to the inmate describe the alleged conduct, describe
the procedure to be followed at the hearing, and cite to the institutional rule alleged to
have been violated.
95. See Gifis 381.
96. While there is a variety of views concerning the listed facets of the hearing, no
court has held that the due process clause requires an administrative appeal from the
decision of the disciplinary board, and several have said that such an appeal is not re-
quired. See Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537, 541 (1st Cir. 1974); Crafton v.
Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521, 539 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Pearson v. Townsend, 362 F. Supp.
207, 224 (D.S.C. 1973); United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 947
(E.D. Pa. 1973); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1090 (M.D. Fla.), vacated
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Ninth Circuit, in Workman v. Mitchell,9 7 held that a federal disciplinary
board must hear the accused's witnesses unless it could show an "undue haz-
ard,"198 while in Murphy v. Wheaton,a9 an Illinois district court held that an
inmate is entitled to present at least four witnesses and any relevant docu-
mentary or tangible evidence in the absence of a showing of danger or irrel-
evance. 100 In Taylor v. Schmidt,' 10 on the other hand, a Wisconsin district
court held that a procedure under which the committee decides ex parte if
the accused's witnesses are essential is constitutional under Wolff.' 02
Although the Wolff Court was quite emphatic in its ruling that cross-
examination of staff members was not required,10' most later cases have
liberally interpreted this restriction. A majority of courts have ruled that the
confrontation right may be denied only when its exercise would either subject
the witness to a substantial risk of harm or pose a major risk to the security
of the institution as a whole.' 0 4 If confrontation is denied, the disciplinary
committee must make a notation of the reasons for denial in the record of
the proceeding, explain the reasons for the decision to the accused, and
summarize the confidential testimony "with sufficient detail to permit the
inmate to rebut it intelligently."' 105 One circuit court warned that failure to
and remanded on other grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973); Landman v. Royster, 333
F. Supp. 621, 653-54 (1971), enforced, 354 F. Supp. 1292, supplemented, 354 F.
Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973). Sands and Landman state that if an appeal is allowed,
the review must be only of the record presented in the hearing. Most systems do allow an
appeal to the warden. ABA RESOURCE CENTER ON CORRECTIONAL LAW AND LEGAL
SERvicEs, supra note 59, at 130.
97. 502 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1974).
98. Id. at 1210. Accord, Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Miss. 1975).
99. 381 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. IlM. 1974).
100. Id. at 1257. The court found that "absent special circumstances" a disciplinary
committee must allow a prisoner to call witnesses. Id.
101. 380 F. Supp. 1222 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
102. Id. at 1225.
103. The Court characterized the reason for this holding, stating:
But in the current environment, where prison disruption remains a serious con-
cern to administrators, we cannot ignore the desire and effort of many States
. . . to avoid situations that may trigger deep emotions and that may scuttle
the disciplinary process as a rehabilitative vehicle.
418 U.S. at 568.
104. See Clutchette v. Procunier, 510 F.2d 613, 616 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub
nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975); Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482,
491 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Fano v. Meachum, 387 F. Supp. 664, 667 (D. Mass. 1975);
Daigle v. Hall, 387 F. Supp. 652, 660 (D. Mass. 1975).
105. Daigle v. Hall, 387 F. Supp. 652, 660 (D. Mass. 1975). Accord, Clutchette v.
Procunier, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S.
Ct. 2414 (1975); Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Fano v.
Meachum, 387 F. Supp. 664, 667 (D. Mass. 1975); Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521
(M.D. Tenn. 1974); Nimmo v. Simpson, 370 F. Supp. 103, 105-06 (E.D. Va. 1974).
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comply with the above standards "will be deemed prima facie evidence of
abuse of discretion."' 10 6 Cross-examination rules are quite similar. 10 7 One
district court ruled that submission of written questions by the inmate and his
staff advocate to the chairman of the disciplinary committee for use in the
hearing was sufficient.' 0 8
With regard to the availability of a counsel substitute, one district court
held that such assistance must be provided when an inmate is denied the
right to present witnesses on his own behalf for security reasons, 0 9 while
another has implied that staff advocates should be trained in "presenting
facts by examination and cross-examination of witnesses, or by dissecting
or offering complex documentary evidence." 110 Although Wolff left this
issue largely to the discretion of prison administrators, the First Circuit has
noted that most contested cases would in fact be sufficiently complex to
require assistance under the Wolff standard; therefore, "wise administrative
practice would suggest [assistance] in marginal cases, if not in all cases."'
Because it provides a basis for complaint to the federal court for violation
of due process rights or for an arbitrary basis of decision, the requirement of
a record of the disciplinary hearing is perhaps the most important of the
Wolff guarantees. 1 2 Pre-Wolff cases found that corrections authorities were
not conscientious recordkeepers." 58 Accordingly, one district court ordered
installation of a tape recording system," 4 and a recent opinion enjoined
106. Clutchette v. Procunier, 510 F.2d 613, 616 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975).
107. See, e.g., Walker v. Hughes, 386 F. Supp. 32, 36, rev'g mem. 375 F. Supp. 708
(E.D. Mich. 1974); Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
108. Taylor v. Schmidt, 380 F. Supp. 1222, 1225-26 (W.D. Wis. 1974). Another
court held that the inmate must be allowed to question the officer writing the incident
report. Walker v. Hughes, 386 F. Supp. 32, 42 (E.D. Mich. 1974). In part, the court
justified its holding on the character of the institution concerned, a medium-security fa-
cility for young offenders.
109. Walker v. Hughes, 386 F. Supp. 32, 42-43 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
110. Taylor v. Schmidt, 380 F. Supp. 1222, 1225 (W.D. Wis. 1974).
111. Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537, 541 (1st Cir. 1974).
112. See 418 U.S. at 564-65.
113. As one district court described the situation:
More often than not, the Offense and Disciplinary Action Report reveals only
the notation of "guilty" or "not guilty," and the punishment imposed. This
practice invites arbitrariness by failing to demonstrate that the decision reached
was actually based upon evidence the prisoner had an opportunity to refute.
Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521, 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
114. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1089 (M.D. Fla.), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973). Contra, Crafton v. Luttrell,
378 F. Supp. 521 (M.D. Tenn. 1974) (verbatim recording desirable but not constitution-
ally required).
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Wisconsin disciplinary proceedings until procedures were implemented which
would result in a comprehensive record of the proceedings. 1 5 Courts have
shown an intention to strictly enforce this record requirement. For example,
in a damage action contesting the discipline of a prisoner for possession of
political literature, the Second Circuit upheld the district judge's refusal to
credit testimony of officers which added reasons for the confinement to those
listed on the contemporaneous record.""
Wolff supports the presence of corrections officers on the hearing board,' 17
but several courts have doubted the ability of correctional management to
remain genuinely neutral when sitting in judgment of an inmate accused of
misconduct by a guard."" All courts passing on the issue have held that the
presence of a witness to, or an investigator of, the underlying incident on the
hearing board is a deprivation of due process."19
115. Taylor v. Schmidt, 380 F. Supp. 1222, 1232 (W.D. Wis. 1974). But see Pearson
v. Townsend, 362 F. Supp. 207, 224 (D.S.C. 1973) (one-page form entitled "Adjustment
Committee Action" with spaces for "Inmate's Statement," "Adjustment Committee
Discussion," and "Disposition" acceptable if properly completed).
116. United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583, 587 (2d Cir. 1975); cf.
Clutchette v. Procunier, 510 F.2d 613, 616 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Enomoto
v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975). But cf. Jordon v. Keve, 387 F. Supp. 765, 770 n.16
(D. Del. 1974).
117. All of the circuit courts that have considered the question agree. E.g., Clutch-
ette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 820 (9th Cir.), modified and remanded, 510 F.2d
613 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct. 2414
(1975). But cf. Walker v. Hughes, 375 F. Supp. 708, 716 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Colligan
v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1233 (E.D. Mich. 1972). In Colligan, the court stated
that it would ban the accused inmate's caseworker, and anyone in a "superior-subordi-
nate relationship" with the accuser, from the panel. Id. at 1237.
118. The court in Taylor v. Schmidt, 380 F. Supp. 1222 (W.D. Wis. 1974), con-
cluded that the complexity of personal and official relations among the senior officers on
the disciplinary committee and the staff members filing misconduct reports on one side
and the inmates on the other meant that "the committee is predisposed to believe that
the conduct report is accurate unless the inmate shows otherwise." Id. at 1226. Accord,
Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), modified and remanded, 510 F.2d
613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975);
Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1085 (M.D. Fla.), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973).
119. See, e.g., Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), modified and
remanded, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S.
Ct. 2414 (1975); Gates v. Collier, 390 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Miss. 1975); Daigle v.
Hall, 387 F. Supp. 652, 660 (D. Mass. 1975); Taylor v. Schmidt, 380 F. Supp. 1222,
1226 (W.D. Wis. 1974); Fife v. Crist, 380 F. Supp. 901, 910 (D. Mont. 1974); Crafton
v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521, 536 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F.
Supp. 1062, 1084 (M.D. Fla.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 491 F.2d 417
(5th Cir. 1973).
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D. Miranda Rights in the Disciplinary Hearing 20
Possession of drugs, assault on inmates and guards, acts of homosexuality,
and destruction of prison property are common infractions brought before
disciplinary committees. All of these may also be criminally prosecuted.'
2 1
Since virtually all disciplinary hearings require a statement by the inmate on
his own behalf in order to rebut the evidence of guilt or to mitigate the
severity of punishment, 122 the dilemma facing the accused inmate is severe
indeed. Unanimous rulings that administrative punishment does not preclude
subsequent criminal prosecution for the same offense exacerbates the prob-
lem.' 2 3 The Supreme Court's decision in Mathis v. United States,12 4 applying
the standards of Miranda v. Arizona12 5 to any custodial interrogation in
which ithere is the "possibility [that the matter will] end up in criminal prose-
cution,' 26 would appear to include disciplinary proceedings, 27 but the pro-
tection of warnings and the exclusionary rule may not be sufficient. Silence
hinders the defense of the inmate before the disciplinary committee, and even
if courts were to consider statements to the committee as being involuntary
per se, the exclusionary rule no longer bars all use of a defendant's involun-
tary statements.
1 28
120. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For a general discussion, see Turner
& Daniel, Miranda in Prison: The Dilemma of Prison Discipline and Intramural Crime,
21 BUFFALO L. REV. 759 (1972).
121. Thirty-five percent of all charges brought before the disciplinary committee in
Rhode Island in 1972 were potential targets of criminal prosecution. Harvard Center for
Criminal Justice, supra note 33, at 212. Of 174 cases in Massachusetts prisons which
could have been sent to the district attorney from September 1971 to January 1972, only
21 were actually referred. CENTER FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BosroN UNrvERsrrY SCHOOL
OF LAW, supra note 82, at 116. Gifis found that "the [disciplinary] board is often used as
a screening agency to recommend to the superintendent whether court action should be
initiated." Gifis 401.
122. See pp. 49-51 supra.
123. See, e.g., Rivera v. Toft, 477 F.2d 534, 535 (10th Cir. 1973); Daigle v. Hall,
387 F. Supp. 652, 661 (D. Mass. 1975); Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1381
(D. Del. 1974). Conversely, an inmate indicted for a substantive crime and acquitted by
a jury cannot be the subject of a prison disciplinary proceeding inasmuch as the verdict is
"a final determination against the Government." Barrows v. Hogan, 379 F. Supp. 314,
316 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
124. 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
125. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
126. 391 U.S. at 4.
127. Decisions which have so concluded include Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d
809 (9th Cir. 1974), modified and remanded, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub
nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975); Fowler v. Vincent, 366 F. Supp.
1224, 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Carter v. McGinnis, 351 F. Supp. 787, 792 (W.D.N.Y.
1972).
128. Statements "volunteered" following the waiver of Miranda rights can be intro-
duced, and statements made in the absence of warnings can be used for purposes of
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Courts have utilized three different approaches to the Miranda problem,
but none has proven fully satisfactory. The first decision to confront the
issue, Clutchette v. Procunier,12 9 ordered California disciplinary boards to
provide counsel to inmates "when the offense charged may be referred to
the district attorney for prosecution . . . so as to maintain the integrity of
the fifth amendment right to remain silent."' 8 0 Although the validity of this
decision seems doubtful in light of Wolff, 13' on rehearing the panel reaffirmed
its earlier holding.'
8 2
A second group of decisions criticized the Clutchette approach as ineffec-
tive since the mere presence of counsel would not remove the inherent
pressure on the inmate to waive his Miranda rights,133 and concluded that
regardless of the effect of the presence of counsel "it is simply intolerable
that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert
another."'83 4 Relying on cases concerning internal investigations of public
employees, such as Garrity v. New Jersey, 8  which have implied an
immunity for statements of the accused to the authorities, these cases have




impeachment following the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971).
129. 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd as modified, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.
1974), modified and remanded, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom.
Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975).
130. 328 F. Supp. at 779.
131. The Wolff Court viewed the presence of counsel as antithetical to the therapeu-
tic goals of a disciplinary proceeding and also stated that provision of counsel would be
impractical. 418 U.S. at 570.
132. "Nothing in Wolff suggests to us that our reasoning or our conclusion on this
issue requires reconsideration, and we decline appellants' request that we do so." 510
F.2d at 616.
133. See Fowler v. Vincent, 366 F. Supp. 1224, 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Sands v.
Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1093 (M.D. Fla. 1973), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973). A further problem concerns statements
made to a staff advocate by the accused inmate since, as one court viewed the problem,
"it is not clear that any privilege would preclude [their] use in subsequent criminal
proceedings . . . either because they were 'voluntarily' made or for purposes of impeach-
ment." Carter v. McGinnis, 351 F. Supp. 787, 794 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
134. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1093 (M.D. Fla.), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973).
135. 385 U.S. 493 (1967). See also Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968);
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
136. See Fowler v. Vincent, 366 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), in which the court
made the analogy and noted that "the loss of liberty [is] an even stronger compulsion
than loss of employment, and thus the need for immunity may be correspondingly
greater." Id. at 1228. The court also evaluated the effectiveness of the use of immunity,
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The First Circuit initially adopted the immunity approach in Palmigiano v.
Baxter,137 but on remand from the Supreme Court following Wolff, the panel
retreated from its earlier position. Noting that prison officials had no
inherent authority to immunize statements from later use in criminal pro-
ceedings and that stenographic transcripts were expensive, yet essential, if
immunity were to be meaningful, the court found the solution impractical. 13
Further, the court felt that blanket immunity "cheapens the Fifth Amend-
ment," 39 and that although a prisoner might be placed in an awkward
position by the disciplinary hearing pending prosecution, "not every adverse
consequence which flows from remaining silent can be characterized as an
unconstitutional penalty upon the exercise of the privilege against self-
incrimination.'1 40 Hence, a third position was adopted: the inmate must be
warned of his right to remain silent whenever prosecution is a "realistic
possibility"; his silence must not be used against him; and "prison authorities
should consider whether defense counsel, if requested, should not be let into
the proceeding .... ",141
E. Prehearing Confinement
In almost all serious cases, the offending inmate is taken to a segregation
unit pending his hearing.' 42 Such an action involves a balance between "the
and stated that "it fully protects the prisoner's right against self-incrimination and yet
permits the prison disciplinary system to retain a speed and flexibility which should not
be encumbered by excessive procedural formality." Id. at 1228; accord, Palmigiano v.
Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1084
(M.D. Fla.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973);
Carter v. McGinnis, 351 F. Supp. 787 (W.D.N.Y. 1972). Contra, Clutchette v. Procu-
nier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), modified and remanded, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975).
137. 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 908 (1974).
138. 510 F.2d 534, 536 (Ist Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975).
139. 510 F.2d at 536.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 537; accord, Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521, 539 (M.D. Tenn.
1974). The proposed rules promulgated by the Boston University Center for Criminal
Justice and the proposed standards suggested by the National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals each call for deferral of disciplinary action when
the state intends to prosecute. CENTER FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BOSTON UNIvERsrrY
SCHOOL OF LAW, supra note 82, Rule IVA-2; NATIONAL ADvISORY COMMISSION ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON CORRECTIONS, standard 2.11
(1973).
142. Gifis states that this is done in all cases at MCI, Concord. Gifis 385. The Rhode
Island study found that lockups were ordered in over 50 percent of all cases surveyed.
Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, supra note 33, at 206 n.68.
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deprivation of basic human rights," ' 14 and the "safety and security of the
prison and its general population,'"144 with the legality of the detention
depending on the gravity of the situation in the prison, the length of the
confinement prior to the hearing, and the conditions of confinement. Reluc-
tant to limit the discretion of administrators during potential emergencies,
despite the potential for abuse, the most libertarian courts have limited the
showing of necessity to "a good-faith determination that immediate action
[was] necessary.' 145 In most cases, courts have required that hearings for
confined inmates be held within 48 to 72 hours, 46 and have urged that the
confinement be such as to minimize the loss of privileges prior to a
determination of guilt.' 47 When the prison is in turmoil, however, adminis-
trators are free to do virtually what they wish short of corporal punishment
and reprisal.1 48 Similarly, the decision to order institution-wide "lockups,"
143. United States ex rel. Neal v. Wolfe, 346 F. Supp. 569, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The
court included the phrase in this statement: "Maintenance of control and security may
not be used to justify the deprivation of basic human rights unless in pursuance of valid
objectives and provided that the rudiments of due process are first observed." Id. at 574.
144. United States ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 467 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1972).
145. Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 817 n.15 (9th Cir. 1974), modified
and remanded, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette,
95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975). Judge Stapleton has written that "[tihe test . . . is one of
reasonableness under all the circumstances of the case." Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F.
Supp. 1373, 1380 (D. Del. 1974). One court would require a showing that the inmate's
continued presence in the general prison population poses an actual threat to the security
of the institution. Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 422 (E.D. Okla. 1974). The Na-
tional Advisory Commission standards limit prehearing detention to instances in which
"the head of the institution finds that [the accused inmate] constitutes a threat to other
inmates, staff members or himself." NATIONAL ADviSoRY COMMISSION ON CIMiNA.
JUSTICE STANDtARDS AND GOALS, supra note 141, Standard 2.12.
146. See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 422 (E.D. Okla. 1974);
Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292, 1296, supplemented, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D.
Va. 1973); cf. United States ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 338 F. Supp. 311 (W.D.N.Y.
1971), affd, 467 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1972).
147. See Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), modified and
remanded, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.) cert. granted sub nom. Enomoto v. Cutchette, 95 S.
Ct. 2414 (1975); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292, supplemented, 354 F. Supp.
1302 (E.D. Va. 1973); cf. Rivera v. Fogg, 371 F. Supp. 938, 939 (W.D.N.Y. 1974).
148. Extended periods of detention have been upheld as not violative of due process
by various courts. See Biagiarelli v. Sielaff, 483 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1973) (inmate's
detention for two months and five days upheld because prison officials believed prisoner
to be member of escape conspiracy); Murphy v. Wheaton, 381 F. Supp. 1252, 1255-56
(N.D. Ill. 1974) (187-day detention permitted following a prison riot); Watkins v.
Johnson, 375 F. Supp. 1005, 1006 (E.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd mem., 511 F.2d 1397 (3d Cir.
1975) (one-week detention allowed for inmate charged with assault on another in-
mate during a prison riot); Mills v. Oliver, 367 F. Supp. 77, 79-80 (E.D. Va. 1973)
(one-week detention affirmed in light of long investigation time required after prison
riot); Simmons v. Russell, 352 F. Supp. 572, 578 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (four-week detention
of 100 inmates authorized following a riot).
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during which all inmates are confined to their cells, is vested in the sound
discretion of the prison officials "when taken in response to a real threat to
prison security and when limited to a reasonable period of time to allow for
the cooling of inflamed passions on both sides."'1 49 A federal court will inter-
vene only on a showing that the lockup was ordered for the purpose of singling
out an individual or group for punishment, 1 0 or when the shutdown has con-
tinued for such an extended period that its continuation rises to the level of
cruel and unusual punishment.'
F. Length of Confinement: A Requirement of Periodic Review
As long as the imposition of the confinement does not contravene the
eighth amendment," 2 a prisoner may be kept in punitive isolation for an
indefinite period of time. '53 But such an inmate must be granted the right to
periodic review hearings in an adversary setting in which he may contest the
reasons for his continued confinement." 4 The hearing must provide the same
safeguards as a normal disciplinary hearing.",' Two district courts require
written standards to judge the need for continued confinement,1 0 and
another has ordered a prison disciplinary board to consider reports from the
inmate's counselor in making its findings. 157
149. United States ex rel. Nelson v. Twomey, 354 F. Supp. 1151, 1152 (N.D. IlL.
1973) (nine-day lockup following an assault on several guards); accord, Hoitt v. Vitek,
361 F. Supp. 1238, 1242 (D.N.H. 1973), alf'd, 497 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1974); Bowers v.
Smith, 353 F. Supp. 1339, 1343 (D. Vt. 1972). The Center for Criminal Justice model
rules call for a 48-hour lockup on the order of the warden and an indefinite extension of
the lockup on order of the Commissioner of Correction. CENTER FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, supra note 82, Rule V-10.
150. See Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F. Supp. 1238 (D.N.H. 1973), af 'd, 497 F.2d 598 (1st
Cir. 1974).
151. See Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 410 (E.D. Okla. 1974). The court
found that a 7' -month lockup was the result of the state's lack of personnel and con-
sequent inability to control the prisons.
152. See pp. 73-84 infra.
153. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973); Daigle v. Hall, 387 F. Supp.
652, 660 (D. Mass. 1975).
154. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 635-36 (7th Cir. 1973); Daigle v. Hall, 387 F.
Supp. 652 (D. Mass. 1975); Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521, 533 (M.D. Tenn.
1974); Kelly -v. Brewer, 378 F. Supp. 447, 454-55 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Aiken v. Lash,
371 F. Supp. 482, 495 (N.D. Ind. 1974), modified, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975); Bowers
v. Smith, 353 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (D. Vt. 1972).
155. See cases cited note 154 supra.
156. See Daigle v. Hall, 387 F. Supp. 652, 660 (D. Mass. 1975); Kelly v. Brewer, 378
F. Supp. 447, 455 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
157. Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521, 533 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). The court also
required that the inmate be allowed an informal weekly meeting with his counselor in
which to present facts and circumstances in support of his release.
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III. BEYOND Wolff: NONDISCIPLINARY DECISIONS
A. Procedural Due Process Considerations
As previously noted, an inmate's location, classification, job assignment,
and treatment program may be of equal or greater importance than any
question regarding discipline, particularly if he is "pulling his time" without
significant confrontations with others. Although Wolff cut back on discipli-
nary safeguards endorsed by some lower courts, its explicit recognition of
due process rights of the incarcerated added impetus to an already nascent
movement toward the application of due process to other key decisions.'1 8
Stitching together the Wolff majority's flat statement that due process does
attach, 159 the aforementioned footnote concerning the protections required
for proceedings that might lead to solitary confinement, 160 and such caution-
ary language as "[o]ur conclusion . . . is not graven in stone,"'' some
later courts have held that the Wolff requirements must be applied to all
prison decisions which can result in a "grievious loss" to the inmate.162
158. Just prior to the decision in Wolff, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, quoting
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972), wrote:
"But, to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place,
we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake"....
[A]ny prison disciplinary proceeding that impairs a prisoner's residuum of lib-
erty or adversely affects his property interest (and which is not de minimus)
condemns a prisoner "to suffer a grievous loss," as that term is now understood.
Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 1974), modified and remanded, 510
F.2d 613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct. 2414
(1975); accord, Newkirk v. Butler, 499 F.2d 1214, 1217-18 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated as
moot sub nom. Preiser v. Newkirk, 95 S. Ct. 2330 (1975); Gomes v. Travisono, 490 F.2d
1209 (Ist Cir. 1973); Walker v. Hughes, 375 F. Supp. 708, 713, superseded, 386 F.
Supp. 32 (E.D. Mich. 1974); King v. Higgins, 370 F. Supp. 1023, 1027 (D. Mass.),
aff'd, 495 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1974); Aikens v. Lash, 371 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ind.
1973), modified, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975); Croom v. Manson, 367 F. Supp. 586
(D. Conn. 1973); Bowers v. Smith, 353 F. Supp. 1339, 1345-46 (D. Vt. 1972); United
States ex rel. Neal v. Wolfe, 346 F. Supp. 569, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
159. "There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this
country . . . . They [prisoners] may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law." 418 U.S. at 555-56.
The property rights of inmates have not drawn much attention. One New York district
court has held that charges of "unjustifiable confiscation of personal property" stated a
claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Shumate v. People, 373 F.
Supp. 1166, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). But another district court, in a later case, stated that
property theft by guards was not actionable in federal court unless it involved legal
papers. Butler v. Bensinger, 377 F. Supp. 870, 875-76 (N.D. II1. 1974).
160. See note 84 supra.
161. 418 U.S. at 572.
162. E.g., Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974), in which the
court stated:
The Supreme Court's suggestion that "the better course at this time . is to
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The extension has been based upon two divergent premises. The most
common is that the Wolff guarantees protect an inmate who faces institution-
al discipline resulting in a major change in the conditions of confinement,
whether loss of good time, segregation or transfer.'63 A decision is discipli-
nary when based upon "specific prior conduct . . . notwithstanding the
presence of elements of treatment, security or administrative necessity."'1 64
Thus, under this view, decisions which may in fact adversely affect an
inmate, such as a transfer or a change in jobs, but which are precipitated by
neutral events, such as overcrowding or a change in the nature of the
institution, may be made without a hearing.165
Other courts have interpreted Wolff in a more expansive manner and
apply its criteria to any change resulting in a "grievous loss," regardless of
the reason for the decision.' 66 The disciplinary effect of the contemplated
measure is one factor to be considered in assessing the level of protection to
be provided, but not to the initial determination of whether due process ap-
plies. 167 Some protection therefore applies to administrative segregation, non-
punitive transfers, reclassification, and the loss of other privileges. The Su-
preme Court had an opportunity to resolve the split during the 1974-75 Term
when it considered Preiser v. Newkirk,168 but the case was subsequently dis-
missed as moot.' 69
leave those matters to the sound discretion of officials of state prisons," may
not properly be read as an admonition that courts return to the now almost
forgotten "hands off" policy which characterized prison litigation in the past.
Id. at 350; accord, Clutchette v. Procunier, 510 F.2d 613, 614 (9th Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975); Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d
537 (1st Cir. 1974); Daigle v. Hall, 387 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D. Mass. 1975); Robbins
v. Kleindienst, 383 F. Supp. 239, 248 (D.D.C. 1974). But see Willis v. Ciccone, 506
F.2d 1011, 1017-18 (8th Cir. 1974).
163. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Haymes v. Montayne, 505 F.2d 977 (2d Cir.
1974); Newkirk v. Butler, 499 F.2d 1214, 1217 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated as moot sub
nom. Preiser v. Newkirk, 95 S. Ct. 2330 (1975); Fano v. Meachum, 387 F. Supp. 664
(D. Mass. 1975); Daigle v. Hall, 387 F. Supp. 652 (D. Mass. 1975).
164. Daigle v. Hall, 387 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D. Mass. 1975); accord, United States
ex rel. Haymes v. Montagne, 505 F.2d 977, 980 (2d Cir. 1974); Rosenberg v. Preiser,
388 F. Supp. 639, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
165. See United States ex rel. Haymes v. Montayne, 505 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1974);
Rosenberg v. Preiser, 388 F. Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
166. E.g., Clutchette v. Procunier, 510 F.2d 613, 615 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub
nor. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975); Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537,
539 (1st Cir. 1974); cf. Alamanza v. Oliver, 368 F. Supp. 981 (E.D. Va. 1972).
167. See Clutchette v. Procunier, 510 F.2d 613, 615 (9th Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975); Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d
537, 539 (1st Cir. 1974).
168. 499 F.2d 1214 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 95 S. Ct. 2330 (1975).
169. 95 S. Ct. 2330 (1975). Plaintiff Newkirk had been returned to a minimum
security prison and was due to be paroled in July 1975. Since his complaint did not
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As noted above, few courts have accepted the distinction between "admin-
istrative" and "punitive" segregation when imposed pursuant to a discipli-
nary proceeding.' 70 However, inmates who are not accused of crimes, such
as the victims of attacks by other inmates, may also be involuntarily placed
in segregation. 171 No court has suggested that such an action is unconstitu-
tional,172 but several have stated that the affected inmates must be allowed
a hearing to determine the need for their confinement.
1 7
Although early authority stated that both interstate and intrastate transfers
of inmates from one prison to another were in the sole discretion of prison
officials, 17 4 all recent opinions have taken a view to the contrary. Beginning
with a decision by the First Circuit in Gomes v. Travisono, 75 federal courts
have unanimously held that a transfer of a punitive nature constitutes a
grievous loss,' 76 since the change can affect the individual's life in a variety
of ways.'
77
request damages or class relief, the Court ruled that the matter was moot and did not
fall within the class of controversies which are capable of repetition yet evade review.
Id. at 2335.
170. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
171. See, e.g., CENTER FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
supra note 82, Model Rule Vi-6(a).
172. Indeed, a warden might be adjudged negligent if he failed to direct such
segregation. See notes 277-84 infra. But cf. Judge Craven's dissent in Breeden v. Jack-
son, 457 F.2d 578, 581-82 (4th Cir. 1971) (Craven, J., dissenting).
173. See United States ex rel. Lewis v. Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 600, 604-05 (E.D. Pa.
1974). The right of a warden to segregate a new inmate pending classification also has
been upheld. Bauer v. Sielaff, 372 F. Supp. 1104, 1112 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
174. See Hillin v. Director of Social Serv. & Housing, 455 F.2d 510 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); King v. Worton, 336 F. Supp. 255, 257 (D. Conn.
1972); Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161, 164 (D.N.J. 1971), aff'd, 481 F.2d 1400
(3d Cir. 1973).
175. 490 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 910 (1974).
176. Newkirk v. Butler, 499 F.2d 1214 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated as moot sub nom.
Preiser v. Newkirk, 95 S. Ct. 2330 (1975); Robbins v. Kleindienst, 383 F. Supp. 239
(D.D.C. 1974); Clonce v. Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974); Stone v.
Egeler, 377 F. Supp. 115 (W.D. Mich. 1973), modified, 506 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1974);
People v. Schumate, 373 F. Supp. 1166, 1167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Aikens v. Lash, 371
F. Supp. 482, 488 (N.D. Ind. 1974), modified, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975); King v.
Higgins, 370 F. Supp. 1023, 1027 (D. Mass. 1974); Beathan v. Manson, 369 F. Supp.
783, 787 (D. Conn. 1973) (dictum); Croom v. Manson, 367 F. Supp. 586 (D. Conn.
1973); Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974);
Benfield v. Bounds, 363 F. Supp. 160 (E.D.N.C. 1973); Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F. Supp.
1238, 1251-52 (D.N.H. 1973), aff'd, 497 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1974); Capitan v. Cupp,
356 F. Supp. 302 (D. Ore. 1972); United States ex rel. Neal v. Wolfe, 346 F. Supp.
569, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
177. The court in Robbins v. Kleindienst, 383 F. Supp. 239 (D.D.C. 1974), described
the impact of transfering an inmate, stating:
Such changes clearly may affect adversely, inter alia, an inmate's opportunity
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Transfers may be either interstate or intrastate, or from a minimum or
medium security institution to a maximum security penitentiary, and the
character of the change has had an effect on the attitude of various courts.
The clearest case has been the interstate transfer in which an inmate may be
sent thousands of miles away either within the federal prison system, or by
virtue of various interstate compacts. 178 Transfers to institutions within the
same state have posed greater difficulties, but most decisions hold that due
process also applies whenever "the character of confinement is substantially
changed, raising the inference that the transfer is punitive, rather than purely
administrative."
179
Whether a hearing should precede a nonpunitive transfer to a higher
security institution is the present focus of controversy. The Second Circuit
says that it need not when the basis of the transfer consists of facts
"extrinsic" to the inmate's conduct, such as overcrowding.'8 0 The First
Circuit, however, has adhered to the opposite view because "the disadvan-
tages to the inmate flowing from [a] . . . transfer are substantial, whether it
be characterized as punitive, administrative, or rehabilitative . *.. ."11 Hence
a hearing, however brief, is required for all transfers.
182
for parole, his access to particular rehabilitative facilities .... restrict his
freedom of movement, vary the inmate population with which he associates,
and cause him to be placed in solitary confinement for a period of time.
Id. at 248.
178. See Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1974); Walker v. Hughes, 375
F. Supp. 708, superseded, 386 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Croom v. Manson, 367
F. Supp. 586, 590 (D. Conn. 1973); Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F. Supp. 1238 (D.N.H. 1973),
aff'd, 497 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1974); Capitan v. Cupp, 356 F. Supp. 302 (D. Ore. 1972).
179. Schumate v. People, 373 F. Supp. 1166, 1167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); accord,
Newkirk v. Butler, 499 F.2d 1214 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated as moot sub nom. Preiser
v. Newkirk, 95 S. Ct. 2330 (1975); Fano v. Meachum, 387 F. Supp. 664 (D. Mass.
1975); Daigle v. Hall, 387 F. Supp. 652 (D. Mass. 1975); Stone v. Egeler, 377 F.
Supp. 115 (W.D. Mich. 1973), modified, 506 F.2d 287 (6th Cir. 1974); Walker v.
Hughes, 375 F. Supp. 708, superseded, 386 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Mich. 1974); King v.
Higgins, 370 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Mass. 1974); Aikens v. Lash, 371 F. Supp. 482 (N.D.
Ind. 1973), modified, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Neal v. Wolfe,
346 F. Supp. 569, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
180. United States ex rel. Haymes v. Montayne, 505 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1974). The
court supported this distinction by stating that:
in such cases the . . . decision whether to transfer may not be advanced in any
way by providing notice and a hearing to the transferee. Moreover, although
the dislocation suffered by the transferred prisoner may be burdensome, the
need to avoid more general harm may outweigh his individual claim.
Id. at 980.
181. Gomes v. Travisono, 510 F.2d 537, 541 (1st Cir. 1974).
182. Id. at 539. The court also indicated that the reasons for the transfer should
be noted on the inmate's papers so as to ease his adjustment in the receiving institution.
Id. at 541-42.
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Whatever one's view, a hearing will not be required unless there is poten-
tially significant harm to the inmate. A transfer within the same state to an
institution of similar security classification is solely within administrative dis-
cretion. 18 3 An inmate seeking to move from a maximum security institution to
one with a lesser classification has no federal cause of action since he is seek-
ing a benefit rather than avoidance of the loss of a vested entitlement.
184
The inmate facing a punitive transfer is entitled to the full panoply of
Wolff rights,' 8 5 but in balancing the interests of the inmate and the
institution, one could convincingly argue that the scale should tip more on
the side of the inmate in the transfer case. Transferred inmates face all of
the same hardships as those placed in solitary confinement, 186 suffer a greater
disruption in their personal lives, and undergo a permanent change in classifi-
cation. Conversely, the use of transfers, particularly interstate transfers, is
rare compared to other disciplinary measures, lowering the administrative
burden on prison officials.' 8 7 Inmates should also be entitled to a hearing
before a nonpunitive but still major transfer. 188 At the same time, all courts
have allowed officials the discretion to conduct emergency transfers when
"the general security of the institution is immediately threatened,' 1 89 such as
183. E.g., Schumate v. People, 373 F. Supp. 1166, 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), in which
the court noted that a "transfer between two correctional institutions of similar char-
acter and security classification is within the . . . discretion of state correctional offi-
cials." Accord, Beatham v. Manson, 369 F. Supp. 783, 787 (D. Conn. 1973); Benfield
v. Bounds, 363 F. Supp. 160, 162 (E.D.N.C. 1973).
184. See Mueller v. Turcott, 501 F.2d 1016, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 1974). In Mueller, the
plaintiff wished to transfer from maximum security to a lesser security institution to
learn electronics. The officials' reasons for denial of the transfer, a need for close
supervision and better medical facilities at the maximum security prison, were held to be
rational. No hearing was required. Id. at 1017-18.
185. See Robbins v. Kleindienst, 383 F. Supp. 239, 248 (D.D.C. 1974); cf. Newkirk
v. Butler, 499 F.2d 1214 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated as moot sub nom. Preiser v. Newkirk,
95 S. Ct. 2330 (1975).
186. Punitive transfer usually follows a period in isolation. See, e.g., Aikens v. Lash,
371 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ind. 1973), modified, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975). The inmates
are often held in isolation at the transferee prison pending reclassification regardless
of the reason for the transfer since there is often a lag between the transfer of the inmate
himself and the arrival of his institutional records. See Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F. Supp.
1238, 1246-47 (D.N.H. 1973), affd, 497 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1974).
187. See Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F. Supp. 1238, 1252-53 (D.N.H. 1973), ajj'd, 497 F.2d
598 (1st Cir. 1974). Prison administrators are generally reluctant to transfer troublemak-
ers. Kraft 49. A transfer hearing should be no more difficult than an ordinary
disciplinary hearing. See Robbins v. Kleindienst, 383 F. Supp. 239, 248 (D.D.C. 1974).
188. See Gomes v. Travisono, 490 F.2d 1209 (1st Cir. 1974) (requiring notice, a
personal hearing before the decisionmaker, a reasonable opportunity to be heard, and a
notation on the transfer papers as to the reasons for the transfer).
189. Aikens v. Lash, 371 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ind. 1973), modified, 514
F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1974).
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imminent threat of a prison uprising, fire, flood, or an epidemic.' 90 '
Just as the transfer places a de facto badge of infamy on the affected
inmate, some prison systems confer an official designation on some inmates
who bear special attention. "Special offender" or "special case designation"
are labels used to control the movement of incarcerated organized crime
figures, "notorious persons," and radicals. 191 The consequences of this
classification, however, may include prolonged solitary confinement, 192 ex-
clusion from social furloughs and release to halfway houses, and delayed
parole.' 93 The designation therefore becomes another "grievous loss" to the
inmate which he should be allowed to contest. The court which has most
thoroughly examined this issue held that the United States Bureau of Prisons
must provide the inmate in question significant procedural safeguards.
94
The constitutional status of routine classification proceedings, however, is
very much in flux. On the one hand, courts have been moving toward a
190. See United States ex rel. Haymes v. Montayne, 505 F.2d 977, 980 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 2676 (1975); Newkirk v. Butler, 499 F.2d 1214, 1219 (2d
Cir. 1974), vacated as moot sub nom. Preiser v. Newkirk, 95 S. Ct. 2330 (1975);
Robbins v. Kleindienst, 383 F. Supp. 239, 248 n.5 (D.D.C. 1974); ,Hoitt v. Vitek, 361 F.
Supp. 1238, 1253 (D.N.H. 1973), afld, 497 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1974).
Once an inmate has been transferred under such conditions, the courts have held that
the inmate must be returned to the transferee prison for a hearing once the emergency
has passed. Newkirk v. Butler, supra, at 1219 (return as soon as practicable); Kessler
v. Cupp, 372 F. Supp. 76, 78 (D. Ore. 1973) (return within 30 days). Additionally, the
authorities must bring the inmate to his home state for parole hearings and court ap-
pearance. Hoitt v. Vitek, supra, at 1254.
191. Such designations are used by both the federal and California systems. See
Catalano v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 346 (D. Conn. 1974); Allen v. Nelson, 354 F.
Supp. 505 (N.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 484 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1973). In both systems, the
designation is marked on the prisoner's file and is present during all status considera-
tions. The Bureau of Prison's Policy Statement 79.0047 (April 30, 1974), establishes
eight categories of special offenders: nonfederal prisoners presently housed in federal
prisons, members of organized crime, protection cases, custody risks, subversives, notori-
ous individuals, persons who pose a danger to high government officials, and an offender
who requires close supervision.
192. See Allen v. Nelson, 354 F. Supp. 505, 512-13 (N.D. Cal. 1972), af'd, 484 F.2d
960 (9th Cir. 1973), in which the plaintiff Allen was confined in solitary for 18
months for being an "active, assaultive inmate," a designation which blocked his return
to the general population and of which he was unaware until he filed suit against the
warden.
193. See Catalano v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 346, 350-51 (D. Conn. 1974).
194. Id. at 352-53. The Catalano court held that the inmate was entitled to notice, a
hearing, an opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence, full confronta-
tion with the nature of the evidence before him, a limited right to counsel, a written
finding in support of the classification and a right of appeal through the prison system to
the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.
Such safeguards were deemed appropriate because of the potential harm to the inmate
as balanced against the lesser security needs of the institution, since "special offender"
designation is not imposed as an emergency measure.
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requirement of a hearing before sending allegedly violent inmates into
special maximum security custody or behavior modification programs. For
example, in Clonce v. Richardson'95 a federal district court considered the
process of placing an individual in the now defunct federal Special Training
and Rehabilitation Program (START).196 The court concluded that while
the Bureau of Prisons had the power to place a man in such a program, the
conditions of confinement represented such a major change, even from
maximum security isolation in another prison, that a preconfinement hear-
ing was required by the Wolff decision.' 97 Two earlier decisions regarding
analogous programs reached the same conclusions.' 98
Relying on Clonce, another district court stated in dictum that any major
change in a prisoner's security classification should be preceded by an
administrative hearing of some kind.' 9 9 Two circuit courts, however, have
indicated that a hearing is not required in some situations.2 00 An interesting
exception to this rule was developed in Virginia, where Judge Robert
Merhige exercises extraordinary supervision over the local penal system.
There, the authorities divide decisions between a punitive Adjustment
Committee and the nonpunitive Institutional Classification Committtee
(ICC).201 In a series of decisions, Judge Merhige held that an inmate facing
reclassification to a higher security status is entitled to an informal hearing
before the ICC, preceeded by notice containing a general indication of the
adverse reports which will be considered. 20 2
195. 379 F. Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
196. Under this program, inmates from throughout the federal system who exhibited
chronically aggressive and assaultive behavior were sent to Springfield, Missouri, where
they were placed in a maximum security section with minimal privileges and were
constantly monitored by program staff members. A prisoner could remain at this level
for a period of a year but would be allowed increased privileges up to release into the
general population as a reward for desirable behavior. See id. at 344-47.
197. Id. at 349-51. The court supported its decision by stating:
Forced participation in S.T.A.R.T. was obviously designed to accomplish a
modification of the participant's behavior and his general motivation .... A
prisoner may not have a constitutional right to prevent such experimentation
but procedures specifically designed and implemented to change a man's mind
and therefore his behavior in a manner substantially different from the condi-
tions to which a prisoner is subjected in segregation reflects a major change in
the conditions of confinement.
Id. at 350.
198. See Allen v. Nelson, 354 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Cal.), ajI'd, 484 F.2d 960 (9th
Cir. 1973); Bowers v. Smith, 353 F. Supp. 1339 (D. Vt. 1972).
199. Robbins v. Kleindienst, 383 F. Supp. 239, 248 n.3 (D.D.C. 1974).
200. Marnin v. Pinto, 463 F.2d 483, 586 (3d Cir. 1972); Young v. Wainwright,
449 F.2d 338, 339 (5th Cir. 1971). See also McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1334
(5th Cir. 1975).
201. See Ferrell v. Huffman, 350 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Va. 1972).
202. Alamanza v. Oliver, 368 F. Supp. 981, 985 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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As for routine initial classifications of prisoners on their arrival at the
institutions, one recent opinion ruled that when the decision was made by a
neutral classification committee based upon objective material, the inmate
did not have a right to a personal hearing unless the classification would
have a direct bearing on his ability to earn good time. 203
Other decisions affecting the inmate appear to be beyond the pale of
interests requiring due process protection. Although the vast bulk of authori-
ty is to the contrary, the most recent opinion, Clutchette, stated that due
process was required before removal of such privileges as visitation rights,
schooling, recreation and institutional employment. 20 4 Two district courts
have stated that participants in work-release programs could not be summar-
ily removed without a hearing. 20 5 However, most courts have found that
ordinary prison jobs,200  visitation rights,20 7  attendance at a prison
school, 208 allocation of other rehabilitative resources, 20 9 irregularities in
prison pay,210 and minor changes in cell block conditions 211 do not rise to
Although the inmate is not given the right to representation, he should be allowed to
present facts in support of his present classification, see Cousins v. Oliver, 369 F. Supp.
553, 557 (E.D. Va. 1974), to confront adverse witnesses whenever possible, see Jones v.
Institutional Classification Comm., Field Unit No. 8, 374 F. Supp. 706, 711 (W.D. Va.
1974), and to have a decision based upon nonpunitive criteria, see Almanza v. Oliver,
368 F. Supp. 981, 984-85 (E.D. Va. 1973).
203. Jordon v. Keve, 387 F. Supp. 765 (D. Del. 1974). The Delaware classification
scheme in question was similar to those described in notes 15-25 and accompanying text
supra. Although the Jordon court recognized the inmate's interest in the initial classifi-
cation, it found that the system was not adversarial and the court was therefore
reluctant to inject due process formality into the system.
204. Clutchette v. Procunier, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Eno-
moto v. Clutchette, 95 S. Ct. 2414 (1975). The court thought that the loss of these
facilities "can have as debilitating an effect on the amenability of a prisoner to
rehabilitation as loss of some good-time credit or a period of isolation" and that
therefore, before these privileges can be taken away, the inmate must receive notice, a
statement of the reasons for the deprivation, and an opportunity to respond. 510 F.2d at
615.
205. Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521, 534 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Schumate v.
People, 373 F. Supp. 1166, 1169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
206. Gregory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378, 383 (10th Cir. 1975); Beatham v. Manson, 369
F. Supp. 783, 791-92 (D. Conn. 1973).
207. McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir. 1975); James v. Wallace,
382 F. Supp. 1177, 1182 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Rowland v. Wolff, 336 F. Supp. 257, 259
(D. Neb. 1971); cf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
208. United States ex rel. Nelson v. Twomey, 354 F. Supp. 1151, 1153 (N.D. Ill.
1973), rev'd sub nom. Lucien v. Bensinger, 510 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975).
209. McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th Cir. 1975); James v. Wallace,
382 F. Supp. 1177, 1180 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
210. McNeil v. Latney, 382 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Va. 1974).
211. O'Brien v. Moriarty, 489 F.2d 941, 944 (1st Cir. 1974).
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the level of federally protected rights absent a showing of arbitrary and
capricious conduct by prison officials. 212
B. Substantive Constitutional Rights: Conditions of Confinement
In arriving at procedural protections for prisoners under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, courts have had the benefit of ready
analogies to other areas of the law. The notion of a "grievous loss" is now
widely accepted, as is the process of balancing the interest of the individual
in his life, liberty, or property against the needs of government. But
discussion of the substantive constitutional right of a prisoner to decent
treatment has suffered from the lack of comparable doctrine and guidance
from the Supreme Court, resulting in a lack of coherent law. 213
Those standards that do exist have been drawn from the eighth amend-
ment cruel and unusual punishment clause and the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The eighth amendment has been the subject of only
four decisions of the Supreme Court, none of which related to prison
conditions. 214 Three different formulae of the amendment's proscription
have been developed by the lower courts. The most common derives from
the Rochin v. California21 5 conception of "conduct that shocks the con-
science," 21 6 often termed a "barbarous act" by the lower courts. 217 A gloss
on this formula was added by Chief Justice Warren's statement in Trop v.
Dulles,218 that "[,t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. ' '219 In a
212. See Beatham v. Manson, 369 F. Supp. 783 (D. Conn. 1973), in which the court
described the underlying guarantee of protecting against arbitrary and capricious con-
duct, stating:
The basic substantive due process guarantee against arbitrary or capricious
official action applies even where procedural due process does not, as where
the "interest" at stake is not "protected," or where the aggrieved party has been
denied access to an as yet potential benefit, but has not been deprived of an
interest in a benefit already acquired.
Id. at 791.
213. The Fifth Circuit has characterized the reasoning regarding prison practices as
"mottled." Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1330 n.14 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 948 (1975).
214. See Comment, The Role of the Eighth Amendment in Prison Reform, 38 U.
Cm. L. REV. 647 (1971).
215. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
216. Id. at 172.
217. E.g., Marnin v. Pinto, 463 F.2d 583, 585 (3d Cir. 1972); Biagiarelli v. Sielaff,
349 F. Supp. 913, 915 (W.D. Pa. 1972), vacated, 483 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1973). See also
Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972);
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971).
218. 356 U.S. 86(1958).
219. Id. at 101.
1975]
Catholic University Law Review
widely quoted opinion, then Judge :Blackmun interpreted Trop as mandating
a view of the amendment in the light of "broad and idealistic concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency .... -220
The second conception of the amendment's prohibition is one of dispro-
portionality between the cause of the confinement and its conditions, and is
drawn from Weems v. United States221 and Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion in Furman v. Georgia.2 22 Solitary confinement is more closely
scrutinized if it is "lengthy and arduous" and is "imposed for a comparatively
trivial infraction . . . than equivalent punishment for major breaches of
prison discipline" and, in applying the test, the judge must weigh the
"particular form of solitary confinement" against "the goals and needs of the
prison administration and inquire whether the deprivations imposed by that
administration are related to some valid penal objective."'223
Disproportionality enters into the third formula: a ban on punishment
which is arbitrary or capricious or which is "beyond what is necessary to
achieve a legitimate penal goal. ' 224 The difficulty here is that the choice of
legitimate penal goals is not supposed to be entrusted to the judiciary. 225
Thus, Judge Kaufman has stated:
For a federal court, however, to place a punishment beyond the
power of a state to impose on an inmate is a drastic interference
with the state's free political and administrative processes ...
Even a lifetime of study in prison administration and several ad-
vanced degrees in the field would not qualify us as a federal court
to command state officials to shun a policy that they have decided
is suitable because to us the choice may seem unsound or person-
ally repugnant. As judges we are obliged to school ourselves in
such objective sources as historical usage, .. .practices in other
jurisdictions, . . . and public opinion.., before we may responsibly
220. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).
221. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
222. 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
223. Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1388 (D. Del. 1974). The court added
in a footnote: "A corollary principle is that solitary confinement which is arbitrary,
capricious or discriminatory . . . is cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 1388 n.31.
The proportionality test was first applied in the prison context in Jordan v. Fitzharris,
257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966); accord, LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974,
978 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973); Wright v. McMann, 460
F.2d 126, 132-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Crafton v. Luttrell, 378
F. Supp. 521, 532 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); Gray v. Creamer, 376 F. Supp. 675, 679 (W.D.
Pa. 1974).
224. Gray v. Creamer, 376 F. Supp. 675, 679 (W.D. Pa. 1974). For a similar
holding, see Allen v. Nelson, 354 F. Supp. 505, 511 (N.D. Cal.), aftd, 484 F.2d 960
(9th Cir. 1973).
225. See Kaufman, Prison: The Judge's Dilemma, 41 FonrDAm L. Rv. 495 (1973).
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exercise the power of judicial review to declare a punishment un-
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment.220
The quotation points up the bankruptcy of the eighth amendment analysis.
Judge Kaufman's characterization of public opinion, historical usage, and
practices in other jurisdictions as "objective" and of the data of criminolo-
gists as "subjective" is at least ironic.227
None of the tests discussed above can be said to draw distinct lines. In
many respects they are synonymous. "Barbarous" conduct ought to be
grossly disproportionate punishment for the offense charged. So too arbitrary
and capricious conduct by a prison administration is by definition without
relation to a legitimate penal goal. The judgment that a particular practice is
cruel and unusual is therefore ineluctably personal and subjective. As Judge
Tuttle has frankly recognized, what may shock the conscience of one judge
may sit lightly on another's sense of decency. 228 Still, the amendment has
been useful in ending harsh and aberrational practices which fall well below
national standards, especially conditions in entire prison systems character-
ized by terror and brutality.229
If the cruel and unusual punishment clause can best be applied to
outmoded practices applied across the board, then the due process clause has
been used to check individual excesses in which a prisoner is treated harshly
or denied a benefit without substantial justification. 230 The belief that even
a prisoner should be protected from arbitrary and capricious conduct has
formed the basis for judicial review of individual decisions in diverse areas of
226. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 191 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
227. The Sostre court recognized, but was not compelled by, the testimony of Mr. Sol
Rubin, Counsel for the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, and of Dr.
Seymour Halleck of the University of Wisconsin, that isolation for extended periods of
time leads to mental disorientation. Id. at 190.
228. See Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 672 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
968 (1972).
229. See notes 304-24 infra.
230. See, e.g., Allen v. Nelson, 354 F. Supp. 505, 513 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 484
F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1973) (prisoner held in solitary confinement without proof of
"assaultive, violent behavior"); Bowers v. Smith, 353 F. Supp. 1339, 1345-46 (D. Vt.
1972) (prisoner erroneously classified as an escape risk).
This line of reasoning was expressed in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). Judge Friendly analyzed the unconstitutionality of
a guard assault on an inmate:
The thread common to all these cases is that "punishment" has been deliber-
ately administered for a penal or disciplinary purpose, with the apparent au-
thorization of high prison officials . . . . In contrast, although a spontaneous
attack by a guard is "cruel" and, we hope, "unusual," it does not fit any or-
dinary concept of "punishment."
Id. at 1032.
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prison life. 2 1' The test has been stated as a requirement that the state
provide a rational justification for its actions, 2 2 although this test is also
open-ended since "a court makes a subjective determination after the
particular event as to whether a prison official overstepped an unspecified
line of permissible conduct. ' 233
The Fifth Circuit has taken a different approach, contrasting mistreatment
which is inadvertent and occasional with incidents that are caused by
continuing neglect of the needs of the inmates by prison authorities. 234
Robert v. Williams 23 5 involved a 15-year-old prisoner who was accidentally
shot in the head by a shotgun blast from the weapon of an inmate trusty.
Since this accident resulted from the negligent practice of entrusting danger-
ous weapons to untrained and unfit persons, the eighth amendment line was
crossed. Clemmons v. Greggs23 6 provides a contrast. There two prison guards,
faced with rioting inmates, who were, however, effectively locked in their
cells, panicked and threw tear gas canisters into the enclosed cellbock and
then failed to obtain assistance to ventilate the area for a half hour, leading to
serious, but not permanent, injury to several prisoners. The court found that
231. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir.
1975) (punishment of prisoner for surly attitude and possession of inflammatory pa-
pers); Jordan v. Keve, 387 F. Supp. 765, 771 (D. Del. 1974) (classification); James
v. Wallace, 382 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (allocation of rehabilitative serv-
ices and visitation policy); Butler v. Preiser, 380 F. Supp. 612, 620-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(in-prison fundraising for the Attica Brothers Defense Fund); Ricketts v. Ciccone, 371
F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (discretionary medical care); Beatham v. Man-
son, 369 F. Supp. 783, 791-92 (D. Conn. 1973) (allocation of prison jobs).
232. Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1380 (D. Del. 1974); Landman v.
Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 645 (1971), enforced, 354 F. Supp. 1292, supplemented, 354
F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973).
233. Allen v. Nelson, 354 F. Supp. 505, 511 (N.D. Cal.), af'd, 484 F.2d 960
(9th Cir. 1973).
234. See Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866
(1971), in which the court expressed its outlook by stating:
We see . .. cruelty in the sustained maintenance, over a period of time of a
needlessly hazardous condition for . . . prisoners. We might say careless
preparation of a single meal, producing food poisoning in the prisoners, was
not cruel, but it might be so if the jailors [sic] negligently allowed the jail's
only drinking water supply to become permanently infected with typhoid bac-
teria. The word punishment, too, implies a wrong in prison management, in
contrast to the casual dereliction of a minor prison employee. Thus, in an
Eighth Amendment case, if there were, as here, no conscious purpose to inflict
suffering, we would look next for a callous indifference to it at the manage-
ment level, in the sustained knowing maintenance of bad practices and cus-
toms.
Id. at 827.
235. 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971).
236. 509 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1975).
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the action was nonmalicious but in violation of written prison regulations on
the use of tear gas. In addition, the guards involved were disciplined by the
administration. Hence, no violation of the eighth amendment had oc-
curred.
23 7
Given the difficulty in defining a general standard of substantive limits on
prisoner treatment, a more useful and concrete approach is to focus on
particular areas of judicial scrutiny: punishment, personal security, and
medical care.
Punishment. The earliest eighth amendment prison cases concerned the
use of corporal punishment and physical torture on inmates. 238 Later cases
have enjoined reprisal beatings, 239 the use of chemical agents such as mace
and tear gas as punishment, 240 forceful administration of milk of magne-
sia, 241 and the use of starvation diets as punishment.242 At the other
237. Id. at 1340. Chief Judge Brown dissented on the ground that the court failed to
consider a potential due process violation as was found in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d
1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). He felt that the failure of the guards
to come to the aid of the trapped prisoners for an extended period of time constituted a
separate constitutional offense. 509 F.2d at 1340-41 (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
238. E.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). This decision banned
the use of whipping at the Arkansas prison farms.
239. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1971); Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 482 (D. Del. 1974); Butler v. Bensinger, 377
F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
240. Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974), in which the court
noted that:
[Wiardens and other high-level officials at the Oklahoma State Peniten-
tiary at McAlester have approved or acquiesced in the use of chemical agents
as a purely punitive measure against inmates, including even inmates locked
in their cells. . . . for such conduct as loud singing in cells, refusing to get
haircuts or to shave, possession of contraband (such as instant coffee) in cells,
destruction of state property (such as breaking plastic spoons), cursing an offi-
cer, talking in a loud voice or yelling, screaming for a doctor and shaking or
rattling cell doors.
Id. at 414. See also Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 649 (E.D. Va. 1971), en-
forced, 354 F. Supp. 1292, supplemented, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (1973). But cf. Clemmons
v. Greggs, 509 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir. 1975); Poindexter v. Woodson, 357 F. Supp.
443, 456-57 (D. Kan. 1973), affd, 510 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1975).
241. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974). The Gates court also
enjoined the following practices at the Parchman prison farm:
. . . stripping inmates of their clothing, turning the fan on inmates while
naked and wet, depriving inmates of mattresses, hygenic materials, and ade-
quate food, handcuffing inmates to the fence and to cells for long periods of
time, shooting at and around inmates to keep them standing or moving, and
forcing inmates to stand, sit or lie on crates, stumps, or otherwise awkward
positions for prolonged periods.
Id. at 1306.
242. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 207 (8th Cir. 1974);
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (1971), enforced, 354 F. Supp. 1292, supple-
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extreme, relatively minor deprivations have been summarily dismissed, includ-
ing verbal harassment, 243 lack of recreational facilities, 244 restrictions on hair
length, 245 and nonessential creature comforts.
240
If a practice approaches corporal punishment and poses a clear threat to
the health of the inmate, then it is likely to be declared cruel and
unusual. 247 Much of the debate has centered around the use of solitary
confinement as punishment for institutional violations, and specifically on the
use of "strip cells" or "dark holes. '24s Although some would condemn the
use of all forms of punitive segregation as unrelated to a valid penal
objective, use of solitary confinement is presently beyond challenge. Courts
have refused to give credence to testimony of psychological hazards,
249
mented, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973). Serving an inmate food which adminis-
trators knew he would reject on religious grounds was banned in Jones v. Superintendent,
370 F. Supp. 488, 493 (W.D. Va. 1974). But see Novak Y. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 670
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972), which approved a bread and water
diet for limited periods of time.
243. Lunsford v. Reynolds, 376 F. Supp. 526, 528 (W.D. Va. 1974); Schumate v.
People, 373 F. Supp. 1166, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Collins v. Haga, 373 F. Supp. 923,
925 (W.D. Va. 1974).
244. E.g., Lunsford v. Reynolds, 376 F. Supp. 526 (W.D. Va. 1974).
245. E.g., Collins v. Haga, 373 F. Supp. 923 (W.D. Va. 1974). Although the
inmates never win, hair length regulations cause much litigation. These regulations have
been explained on grounds of health and identification. In Texas, however, prisoners
sentenced to solitary are shaved bald upon returning to general population. Although this
is a practice obviously designed as punishment, it has been upheld. See Novak v. Beto,
453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972).
246. E.g., Bauer v. Sielaff, 372 F. Supp. 1104, 1110 (E.D. Pa. 1974), dismissed as
moot, 510 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1975) (deprivation of a comb or pillow and failure to sup-
ply a toothbrush for a week); Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1390 (D. Del.
1974) (lack of reading material); McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297, 311 (E.D.
Va. 1972) (presence of mice and roaches).
247. See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974), in
which the court described the line as one dividing privileges from "the basic necessities
of human existence." Id. at 207.
248. The classic strip cell is a room with concrete or metal walls, no bedding, and no
furnishings except for a "chinese toilet", which is a hole in the floor which can be
flushed to remove human waste, but the flushing mechanism of which is usually outside
of the cell. The cell has no windows and a double door, an interior barred door and a
solid exterior door with a peephole that can be shut to exclude all light.
249. See Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968
(1972); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Kelly v. Brewer, 378 F. Supp.
447, 451-53 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
In Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373 (D. Del. 1974), the court expressed
the rationale supporting the use of solitary confinement:
While aware that more subtle forms of punishment, psychological in nature,
may also offend the Eighth Amendment's guarantee of civilized treatment, the
courts have generally been more tolerant of the non-physical deprivations asso-
ciated with solitary confinement. Accordingly, the isolation from compan-
ionship, severe restriction on intellectual stimulation and prolonged inactivity
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adhering to the belief that "authorities must have some harsher measure to
induce compliance with prison regulations. ' '250 'Indeed, a scheme of indefi-
nite segregation stretching into years has been upheld as long as conditions
are not unhealthy, and the prisoner is allowed regular visits by a psychiatrist
and periodic hearings regarding his confinement.
251
Whether confinement in solitary is cruel and unusual, therefore, rests upon
a balance between the conditions of the cell and the length of confinement.
Only a few practices are clearly forbidden: nudity, 252 a complete lack of
plumbing, 2 3 a complete lack of exercise 254 or opportunity to clean oneself, 251
inadequate ventilation and heat,256 and overcrowding. 257 A rough estimate
is that lightless strip cell confinement will be tolerated for only 24 to at most
72 hours, while punitive isolation in a normal cell but without any amenities
can last up to 30 days. 258 Administrative segregation with some privileges was
an inmate in solitary may often experience have generally escaped Eighth
Amendment censure.
Id. at 1387.
This attitude, however, is not unanimous. See Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302,
1307 (E.D. Va. 1973); cf. LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 885 (1972); Aikens v. Lash, 371 F. Supp. 482, 497-98 (N.D. Ind. 1974), mod-
ified on other grounds, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.'1975); Osborn v. Manson, 359 F. Supp.
1107, 1111 (D. Conn. 1973).
250. Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 670 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968
(1972). See also Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1390 (D. Del. 1973).
251. Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 635 (7th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel.
Tyrell v. Speaker, 471 F.2d 1197, 1202 (3d Cir. 1973); Daigle v. Hall, 387 F. Supp. 652,
660 (D. Mass. 1975); Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521, 532 (M.D. Tenn. 1974);
Bowers v. Smith, 353 F. Supp. 1339, 1344 (D. Vt. 1972).
252. See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Kelly v. Brewer, 378
F. Supp. 447, 453 (S.D. Iowa 1974); Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1387 (D.
Del. 1974); Poindexter v. Woodson, 357 F. Supp. 443, 455-59 (D. Kan. 1973), a/I'd,
510 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1975).
253. See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1301 (5th Cir. 1974); White v. Commis-
sioner of Ala. Bd. of Corrections, 470 F.2d 55, 56 (5th Cir. 1972). The cell need not,
however, have an interior toilet. "Inside plumbing is not a constitutional requirement."
Osborn v. Manson, 359 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (D. Conn. 1973).
254. See Murphy v. Wheaton, 381 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Osborn v.
Manson, 359 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (D. Conn. 1973).
255. See Osbom v. Manson, 359 F. Supp. 1107, 1,112 (D. Conn. 1973).
256. See White v. Commissioner of Ala. Bd. of Corrections, 470 F.2d 55, 56 (5th
Cir. 1973).
257. The court in McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1336 (5th Cir. 1975), held
that placing seven prisoners in a 6' x 8' strip cell for a period of 21 days was cruel and
unusual punishment.
258. See Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 894 (N.D. Miss. 1972), a/I'd, 501 F.2d
1291, 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). The Gates court held that strip cell isolation of 48 to 72
hours was cruel and unusual, while the court in Kelly v. Brewer, 378 F. Supp. 447, 453
(S.D. Iowa 1974), found a period of four days to be the same. The court in LaReau v.
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tolerated for up to two years for a prisoner implicated in a gambling ring,
drug use, rioting, two homicides, threatening prisoners, possession of weapons
and destroying his cell. 2
s9
The doctrines of disproportionality and abuse of discretion are most
important for judging the length of confinement. While "confirmed recalci-
trants" 26 0 will receive little sympathy, a prisoner confined to a strip cell for
21 days for refusal to sign a safety sheet has recovered for cruel and
unusual punishment, 261 and a warden was found liable for confining a
prisoner whose only proven offense was a surly attitude. 262 Careful scrutiny
has been focused on prisoners who were confined for periods of 18
months 263 and wrongly confined as escape risks. 26 4 Judicial action has not al-
ways been entirely consistent, however. One court has upheld segregation of
several inmates in part because the inmates were defiant and consistently
harassing prison officials. 2 5 Another court has held that although the prisoner
was an "active aggressive inmate . . . [who had] no remorse for [his violent
MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973),
found five days of such isolation to be cruel and unusual.
On the other hand, the court in Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972), allowed strip cell isolation with sanitary conditions
for up to 15 days although with a reduced diet, limited clothing, flush toilets, a
drinking fountain, toilet paper, blanket but no mattress, pillow and sheets. The cells were
cleaned at regular intervals. Other examples of acceptable punitive confinement may be
found in Fife v. Crist, 380 F. Supp. 901, 903-04 (D. Mont. 1974); Watkins v. Johnson,
375 F. Supp. 1005, 1010 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affd, 511 F.2d 1397 (3d Cir. 1975); Clem-
ents v. Turner, 364 F. Supp. 270, 274 (D. Utah 1973). The 30-day limit for a normal
cell is taken from Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521, 528 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
259. Royal v. Clark, 447 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1971); cf. Williams v. Wainwright, 350
F. Supp. 33 (M.D. Fla. 1972), in which strip cell use was limited to 10 hours.
260. See Collins v. Schoonfield, 363 F. Supp. 1152, 1167-68 (D. Md. 1973).
261. Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972);
cf. LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878
(1973).
262. United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583, 588 (2d Cir. 1975).
263. See Allen v. Nelson, 354 F. Supp. 505, 512 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aIfd, 484 F.2d
960 (9th Cir. 1973). Allen was confined in administrative segregation after he was
charged with involvement in the death of a guard at the Soledad prison. The charges
were later dismissed. Although Allen had refused to answer questions and was an alleged
militant, the court concluded that without concrete evidence of "overt problem behavior"
he could not be held out of the general population. Id. at 513.
264. See Bowers v. Smith, 353 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (D. Vt. 1972). Plaintiff had
escaped four times in four years and had been sentenced judicially and administratively
for these crimes. During a general reorganization of the Vermont Prison, he was
reclassified into maximum security as an escape risk even though he had not participated
in the disturbances which precipitated the reorganization and had eschewed escape
opportunities. The court found that the reclassification was arbitrary and capricious in
the absence of fresh evidence.
265. Collins v. Schoonfield, 363 F. Supp. 1152, 1168 (D. Md. 1973).
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crime]," 2 66 segregation for administrative reasons was not warranted. Al-
though two district courts have agreed that institutional punishment may be
imposed only when it is necessary for the orderly administration of the prison
and supported by sufficient facts, 26 7 only a strong showing by the prisoner can
overcome the presumption of regularity which supports the administration.
Indeed, given the inability to demonstrate a rational relationship between
prison itself and societal security in general, it would ask too much to demand
such a showing 'between solitary confinement and prison security.
Personal security of inmates. Inevitable violence in the prison has been
taken into account by courts deciding whether the actions of prison adminis-
trators fail to conform with eighth amendment or due process standards in
assuring reasonable protection of inmates either from other inmates or from
prison guards.
Although many charges of guard brutality are filed by prisoners, the
standard for a constitutional tort is difficult to meet. A civil rights action
under section 1983268 must show more than simple assault and battery and
even more than excessive use of force given the fact that prisoners are "not
usually the most gentle or tractable of men and women. 269 Force is justifi-
able when needed in self-defense, breaking up fights between inmates, com-
266. Allen v. Nelson, 354 F. Supp. 505, 508 (N.D. Cal.), affd, 484 F.2d 960 (9th
Cir. 1963).
267. Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 894 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291
(5th Cir. 1974); Allen v. Nelson, 354 F. Supp. 505, 512 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 484
F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1973). In Allen, the court stated that the punishment must be
supported by more than "Talismanic labels such as 'protection,' 'threat to security,' and
the like." Id. at 512. Other cases supporting this position are: United States ex rel.
Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Haymes v.
Montayne, 505 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 2676 (1975); O'Brien v.
Moriarty, 489 F.2d 941, 944 (1st Cir. 1974); Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 635 (7th
Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 471 F.2d 1197, 1202 (3d Cir.
1973); Crafton v. Luttrell, 378 F. Supp. 521, 532 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
268. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
269. In Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973), Judge Friendly set forth the factors to be considered in determining if an alleged
use of force constitutes a section 1983 violation:
[A] court must look to such factors as the need for the application of
force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used,
the extent of the injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the
very purpose of causing harm. ...
Id. at 1033.
Guard attacks have been held to violate both the due process clause, id. at 1032, and
the eighth amendment, Jackson v. Allen, 376 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
1975]
Catholic University Law Review
pelling obedience to lawful orders, 270 protecting state property,2 71 and
recapturing escapees. 272 In an emergency situation, virtually indiscriminate
use of tear gas and fire hoses against confined inmates when lesser measures
involved a significant risk to the lives of the guards has been upheld,2 78 but
the same measures against a helpless inmate population were enjoined in one
case, 274 and held cruel and unusual in another.27 5 Similarly, a prisoner who,
while resisting confinement in a strip cell, was beaten on the hands with hand-
cuffs, causing serious injury to his hands, was allowed to recover.27
8
Prison officials have both a common law and a constitutional duty to
protect inmates from attacks by other inmates. Both standards begin with the
premise that "[i]n a penal institution there is always the danger of riots or
lesser disturbances, which may result in injuries to non-participants.
'277
Hence, reasonable risks must be taken and the tort duty is one of avoiding
"unreasonable risk of injury" with "ordinary care" limited to what is
"commensurate with the danger that is apparent or reasonably to be
foreseen. '278 To prove a constitutional violation, the inmate plaintiff must
demonstrate an "egregious failure to provide security" to him after due
warning of a threat to the authorities, 279 or a failure to stop a continuing
reign of terror in the prison.280 Cruel and unusual punishment has been
270. Butler v. Bensinger, 377 F. Supp. 870, 879 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
271. Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194, 215 (E.D. Ark. 1973), affd in part and
rev'd in part sub. nom. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir.
1974).
272. Id.
273. Poindexter v. Woodson, 357 F. Supp. 443, 456-57 (D. Kan. 1973), aff'd, 510
F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1975).
274. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1971).
275. Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
276. Jackson v. Allen, 376 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
277. McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F. Supp. 297, 312 (E.D. Va. 1972); accord,
Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973); Williams v. United States,
384 F. Supp. 579, 584 (D.D.C. 1974); Schyska v. Shifflet, 364 F. Supp. 116, 119 (N.D.
Ill. 1973); Walker v. McCune, 363 F. Supp. 254, 256 (E.D. Va. 1973); Penn v. Oliver,
351 F. Supp. 1292, 1294 (E.D. Va. 1972).
278. Brown v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 987, 992-93 (E.D. Ark. 1972). The fed-
eral standards of duty are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1970).
279. Walker v. McCune, 363 F. Supp. 254, 256 (E.D. Va. 1973).
280. McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332, 1334 (5th Cir. 1975); Gates v. Collier,
501 F.2d 1291, 1307-09 (5th Cir. 1974); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 646-47
(E.D. Va. 1971). The relief ordered in Gates is illustrative of the possible remedies
available: (1) classification of inmates by severity of offense; (2) reporting and
prosecution of inmates accused of assault, isolation of inmates accused of assault; (3)
rules prohibiting fighting and gambling; (4) procedures for confiscating inmate weapons;
(5) elimination of trusties and an increased guard force; (6) an end to the barracks
housing. 501 F.2d at 1309.
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established when prisons have used armed inmate trusties to patrol the
population, 281 have not instituted classification systems to separate out
violent persons, 282 or have allowed open dormitories to go unpatrolled.28 8
Even in these situations, if prison administrators allow an inmate to have
himself segregated from the rest of the population for self-protection and he
fails to avail himself of that opportunity, despite the deprivation of solitary,
then they may be immune from liability.284
Medical care. The distinction between systematic and individual abuse
shown in the area of inmate assaults carries over into the health care
area. Perhaps because evidence of abuse is more readily verified, however,
courts have shown considerably less sympathy for administrators called
upon to examine the medical needs of prisoners. Although state prison
officials possess broad discretion in determining the nature of treatment
afforded prisoners, 28 5 a failure to provide necessary medication will not go
unremedied. 2
8 6
The most significant cases have been those in which a federal court has
ordered a state prison to develop medical resources to meet the needs of the
inmates. 28 7 Systemic failure is shown when the prison facilities are "inade-
quate to meet predictable health care needs because of obvious and sustained
281. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971), enforced sub nom. Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973), afI'd
in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d
194 (8th Cir. 1974).
282. James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177, 1182 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
283. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
284. See Breeden v. Jackson, 457 F.2d 578, 579 (4th Cir. 1971); Schyska v. Shifflet,
364 F. Supp. 116, 119 (N.D. Ill. 1973). But see Breeden v. Jackson, 457 F.2d 578, 581-
82 (Craven, J., dissenting) (state cannot require well-behaved inmate to choose between
risk of serious injury and normal privileges).
285. See, e.g., Ross v. Bounds, 373 F. Supp. 450, 452-53 (E.D.N.C. 1974) (no
constitutional right to be routinely examined for sickle cell anemia).
286. See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied;
421 U.S. 948 (1975), in which the court stated that
deference should be tendered only as to these necessary or essential concomi-
tants of incarceration .. . .While limited mobility, for example, may be en-
demic to confinement, forcing inmates to endure severe infirmities without
treatment for the duration of confinement is not. In conjunction with this rea-
soning, there has been a proliferation of decisions in which the fact that in-
carceration disables an inmate from procuring aid and creates total dependence
upon the state for treatment has been seized upon as a justification for judicial
scrutiny of prison medical practices.
Id. at 1329.
287. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Battle v. Anderson,
376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D.
Ala. 1972), aff'd, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
See also Costello v. Wainwright, 387 F. Supp. 324 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
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deficiencies in professional staff, facilities and equipment." 2 8 The shortage
amounts to "deliberate indifference" which violates the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.
289
Individual relief for damages is more difficult to obtain. Although systemic
medical malpractice constitutes a violation of constitutional rights, 290 simple
malpractice does not.291 One court has held that in order to recover, a
plaintiff must demonstrate: "1. An acute physical condition; 2. The urgent
need for medical care; 3. The failure or refusal to provide it; and 4. Tangible
residual injury. '' 29 2 Absurdly insufficient or blatantly inappropriate care has
been held to be the equivalent of intentional mistreatment, 298 as has
deliberate indifference to and defiance of express instructions of doctors. 29 '
Interestingly, one circuit has held that an inmate has a right to be free of
nonconsensual surgery when not necessary to save his life or to further a
"compelling interest of imprisonment or prison security. '295
Federal prisoners are governed by a different standard of care under 18
U.S.C. § 4042, which requires provision of "suitable" medical treatment.296
Several courts have ruled in favor of inmates seeking transfers or furloughs
for better medical treatment when the Bureau of Prisons failed to demon-
strate that it could provide the same level of medical care in the facility to
which the inmate was assigned. 297
288. Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 424 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
289. Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224, 1226 (2d Cir. 1974).
290. Mills v. Oliver, 367 F. Supp. 77 (E.D. Va. 1973), in which the court stated
that "[a] prisoner has a constitutional right to reasonable medical treatment." Id. at 79.
291. See Startz v. Cullen, 468 F.2d 560, 561 (2d Cir. 1972); Butler v. Bensinger, 377
F. Supp. 870, 876-77 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Waltenberg v. New York City Dep't of Correc-
tions, 376 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Robinson v. Jordan, 355 F. Supp. 1228,
1230 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
292. Pinon v. Wisconsin, 368 F. Supp. 608, 610 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
293. Thomas v. Pate, 493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 419 U.S. 879
(1974).
294. Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921, 924 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 983 (1971).
State prisoners have recovered under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) in instances when
burns went untreated, Swain v. Garribrant, 354 F. Supp. 631, 633 (E.D.N.C. 1973),
and in one situation when a polio victim, just having had an operation, was forced to
leave a hospital and walk back to the prison while in excruciating pain, leaving perma-
nent injury, Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
983 (1971).
295. Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1974). What constitutes a
compelling interest of imprisonment was left unanswered.
296. See Ricketts v. Ciccone, 371 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
297. Bartling v. Ciccone, 376 F. Supp. 200 (W.D. Mo. 1974); Ricketts v. Ciccone,





Despite the existence of a panoply of rights, obtaining relief for the
wronged inmate is difficult. Even the most sympathetic judges find prisoner
suits vexing,298 and the number of complaints has increased so rapidly that
individual attention to all of the cases is impossible.
A. Systemic relief
The pressures of individual suits and the obvious deficiencies of some
prisons have led federal courts to engage in systemic relief to alleviate
grievances. Following the lead of the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island,299 several courts have encouraged attorneys for
prisoners and for prison administrations to confer and develop a consent
decree by which institutional practices will be modified. 00 One court invited
the Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice to act as a
mediator, with beneficial results.301 In the course of litigation, several courts
have conducted weeks of hearings, have appointed experts to inspect the
facilities in question,'30 2 and have moved the court to the prison itself for
further hearings and inspections by the judge.808
Perhaps the outstanding contribution of the federal courts has been the
exposure and regulation of those prisons which can be compared only with
concentration camps. Aside from the infamous Arkansas Prison Farms,
courts have found similar conditions in Virginia, Mississippi, Alabama, and
Oklahoma. At the Parchman Prison Farms in Mississippi, the court encoun-
tered housing units which were unfit for human habitation, waste disposal
systems which threatened widespread contagion, electrical wiring which posed
an imminent fire hazard, and a complete lack of bathroom, kitchen and heat-
ing facilities; these conditions existed along with an utter inability of the
prison management to protect prisoners and a total lack of rehabilitative pro-
grams.80 4 The Alabama Prison System provided almost no delivery of health
298. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 n.9 (1974); Sparks v. Fuller,
506 F.2d 1238, 1239 (1st Cir. 1974); Morales v. Schmidt, 494 F.2d 85, 86 (7th Cir.
1974); Dreyer v. Jalet, 349 F. Supp. 452, 485 (S.D. Tex. 1972), afrd, 479 F.2d 1044
(5th Cir. 1973); Kochie v. Norton, 343 F. Supp. 956, 957 (D. Conn. 1972). See gen-
erally Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D. 573
(1972).
299. See Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
300. E.g., Frazier v. Donelon, 381 F. Supp. 911, 913-14 (E.D. La. 1974); Goldsby
v. Cames, 365 F. Supp. 395, 396-98 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
301. Frazier v. Donelon, 381 F. Supp. 911 (E.D. La. 1974).
302. Costello v. Wainwright, 387 F. Supp. 324, 326 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Clonce v.
Richardson, 379 F. Supp. 338, 340 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
303. E.g., White v. Sullivan, 368 F. Supp. 292, 294 (S.D. Ala. 1973).
304. See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir. 1974).
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care to prisoners 05 -Indiana confined psychologically disturbed inmates in
isolation blocks characterized by deafening noise and such a lack of personnel
that inmates could be let out for showers only a few times a month.30 6 In
Oklahoma, an eight-month lock-up resulted in vermin-infested cells, a
complete lack of exercise, inadequate health care and a total absence of
rehabilitative programs.
3 07
In such circumstances "the existence of constitutional infirmities deprives
the prison deference rule of its indomitably insulating nature and dictates
that the rule yield to the remedial power of a court. '308 Courts have or-
dered both long and short range relief amounting to control of the state
prison by the federal judge. Immediate relief has included the end of
disciplinary practices found objectionable by the court,309 the end to armed
prisoner trusties and corridor bosses,3 10 the closing of irreparable segregation
305. See Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 948 (1975).
306. See Aikens v. Lash, 371 F. Supp. 482, 493 (N.D. Ind. 1974), modified, 514 F.2d
55 (7th Cir. 1975).
307. See Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
308. Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1332 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 948 (1975). See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir.
1974); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F.
Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1973),
enforced, 354 F. Supp. 1292, supplemented, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (1973); Taylor v. Ster-
rett, 344 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972), af'd in part and vacated in part, 499 F.2d
367 (5th Cir. 1974). But see Aikens v. Lash, 371 F. Supp. 482, 495 (N.D. Ind. 1973),
modified, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975), in which the court found the existence of cruel
and unusual punishment, but deferred action to allow the legislature to take action.
The rationale for massive intervention was stated by the court in James v. Wallace,
382 F. Supp. 1177 (M.D. Ala. 1974):
Where conditions within a prison are such that the inmates incarcerated
therein will inevitably and necessarily become more sociopathic and less able
to adapt to conventional society as the result of their incarceration than they
were prior thereto, cruel and unusual punishment is inflicted.
Id. at 1181. Of course, if all prisons lead to more sociopathic behavior, a position not
without its adherents, then all prisons inflict cruel and unusual punishment.
309. See, e.g., White v. Commissioner of Ala. Bd. of Corrections, 470 F.2d 55, 56
(5th Cir. 1972) (all inmates in solitary confinement must receive toilet paper, toilets
must be flushed three times daily, showers allowed at least once a week); Battle v.
Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 432 (E.D. Okla. 1974) (dark cell confinement must not
exceed an established maximum period); Osborn v. Manson, 359 F. Supp. 1107, 1111
(D. Conn. 1973) (one hour of exercise allowed per day); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp.
881, 900 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (inmates must receive
2,000 calories of food per day, normal institutional clothing, soap, eating utensils, tooth-
brushes, and shaving gear while in isolation; cells must be adequately heated, ventilated
and maintained in sanitary condition; no confinement in a dark cell for more than 24
hours).
310. See Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1291
(5th Cir. 1974); Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411, 423 (N.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 499 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1974).
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units,5" and the immediate hiring of essential medical personnel8 12 and
additional guards to ensure control of the prison. 18 Long range relief has
encompassed the institution of recreational and rehabilitative programs,
1 4
the building of new facilities, 15 and affirmative action hiring to increase the
number of minority personnel in general and on decisionmaking bodies in
particular.8 16  Once severe constitutional deficiencies are demonstrated,
shortages of funds are not an excuse for inaction.3
17
To enforce the ordered relief, courts have retained jurisdiction over
individual cases for years,818 have ordered defendants to maintain detailed
records8 19 and to report all emergencies to the court, 20 and have granted
unlimited access to all prison records by plaintiffs' attorneys.8 2' In some
instances, court-appointed monitors have been used, 822 and in others either
contempt has been threatened 328 or suspended fines imposed.
8 24
311. See Aikens v. Lash, 371 F. Supp. 482, 491 (N.D. Ind. 1973), modified, 514 F.2d
55 (7th Cir. 1975); Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549, 550 (E.D. La. 1972).
312. See Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1331 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 948 (1975); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1303-04 (5th Cir. 1974).
313. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972), in which the
court ordered an additional 110 guards to be hired on a civil service basis, with
affirmative action recruitment of minority employees, as well as six clerks to maintain
records, cooks, eight maintenance men, and interestingly, an experienced penologist to
head the prison and an ombudsman to hear complaints.
314. 'See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 209 (8th Cir. 1974);
James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177, 1181 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Hamilton v. Landrieu,
351 F. Supp. 549, 550 (E.D. La. 1972); Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp. 411, 422 (N.D.
Tex. 1972), af 'd in part and vacated in part, 499 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1974).
315. See Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320, 1325 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 948 (1975); Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549, 550 (E.D. La. 1972).
316. See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 210 (8th Cir. 1974);
Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292, 1297, supplemented, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D.
Va. 1973); Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549, 551 (E.D. La. 1972).
317. See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 202 (8th Cir. 1974);
Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1319 (5th Cir. 1974); Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F. Supp.
411, 422 (N.D. Tex. 1972), af 'd in part and vacated in part, 499 F.2d 367 (5th Cir.
1974).
318. See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974); Gates
v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292,
supplemented, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973).
319. See, e.g., Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 437 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
320. See Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 900 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff'd, 501 F.2d
1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
321. See Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 437 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
322. See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 214 (8th Cir. 1974);
Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1321 (5th Cir. 1974).
323. See Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194, 216 (E.D. Ark. 1973), af'd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir.
1974); Hamilton v. Love, 361 F. Supp. 1235, 1236 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
324. See Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292, 1300-01 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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B. Individual relief
For a variety of reasons, both legal and practical, obtaining individual
relief for prisoners claiming deprivation of civil rights is more difficult than
systemic relief, and the performance of the courts has been less successful.
Jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The holding of the
Supreme Court in 'Haines v. Kerner,32 5 that section 1983 complaints are to
be read with liberality, has made entry into court quite easy, but the require-
ment that a state prisoner demonstrate a violation of a constitutional right
in order to succeed means that a wrong which does not rise to the level of
a constitutional claim will be dismissed. Some federal courts have taken juris-
diction on the basis of pendent jurisdiction3 26 or diversity of citizenship.3 27
For federal prisoners, jurisdiction must be based upon either a federal ques-
tion,3 28 mandamus,3 29 or habeas corpus.330  The result is that they must
demonstrate the exhaustion of administrative remedies, including the comple-
tion of the newly-established internal grievance procedure of the Bureau of
Prisons,33 ' before they can file suit. 33 2 The present consensus of opinion is
that exhaustion of state remedies is not required under section 1983, 3 3 but
325. 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
326. See Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1302 n.4 (5th Cir. 1974); Taylor v.
Sterrett, 499 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1974); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516, 519 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974); Pinon v. Wisconsin, 368 F. Supp. 608,
611 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Dreyer v. Jalet, 349 F. Supp. 452, 466 (S.D. Tex. 1972), afl'd,
479 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1973).
327. See United States ex rel. Fear v. Rundle, 364 F. Supp. 53, 57-58 (E.D. Pa.
1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1974); Dreyer v. Jalet, 349 F. Supp. 452, 465 (S.D.
Tex. 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1973).
328. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Such claims must allege in excess of $10,000 in
controversy.
329. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). See Workman v. Mitchell, 502 F.2d 1201, 1205 (9th
Cir. 1974); Kochie v. Norton, 343 F. Supp. 956, 960 n.2 (D. Conn. 1972).
330. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970).
331. Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement 2001.6, Feb. 14, 1974, reprinted in Thomp-
son v. United States Fed. Prison Indus., 492 F.2d 1082, 1085-7 (5th Cir. 1974).
332. See Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 1974); Jones v. Carlson,
495 F.2d 209, 210 (5th Cir. 1974); Thompson v. United States Fed. Prison Indus., 492
F.2d 1082, 1084 (5th Cir. 1974); Polakoff v. Henderson, 370 F. Supp. 690, 695 (N.D.
Ga. 1973), aII'd, 488 F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1974).
Exhaustion will not be required in all cases. Exceptions exist when exhaustion would
be futile, as when a prisoner challenges a settled policy, Robbins v. Kleindienst, 383
F. Supp. 239, 242 n.1 (D.D.C. 1974), when the administrative remedy is not promptly
and realistically available, Kochie v. Norton, 343 F. Supp. 956, 960 (D. Conn. 1972),
or when immediate relief by a court is too late to be effective, King v. Norton, 336 F.
Supp. 255, 256 n.1 (D. Conn. 1972).
333. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d
1011, 1015 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974); Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F.2d 978, 979-80 (1st Cir.
1974); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1030 n.1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
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there is a nascent and growing movement towards making exhaustion manda-





Injunctive relief. Emergency relief is almost impossible to obtain. Such
relief is authorized by one Second Circuit decision, 35 but judicial reluctance to
interfere in times of emergency and the difficulty which a pro se litigant has
in understanding the rules for preliminary relief make the barriers high. 3
Furthermore, the rapidity of many prison decisions makes injunctive relief
impractical since by the time the prisoner reserves his day in court, he is
likely to have waited many months.
3 37
Once the litigant gets to court, he will find that the scope of review of
prison decisions is narrow indeed. For disciplinary complaints, the general
rule is that a federal court will only check the records to ascertain compli-
ance with due process requirements and the presence of some rational reason
for the decision.338 Whether a violation of state administrative procedures
which are not constitutionally required constitutes a violation of due process
is not yet clear.339 For nondisciplinary decisions to which a due process right
(1973); Hillen v. Director Dep't of Social Serv. & Housing, 455 F.2d 510, 511 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.
1971).
334. Exhaustion of state administrative remedies was required in Marnin v. Pinto,
463 F.2d 583, 586 (3d Cir. 1972); Rocha v. Beto, 449 F.2d 741, 742 (5th Cir. 1971);
Hyde v. Fitzberger, 365 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Md. 1973). The requirement of ex-
haustion was hinted at in Frazier v. Donelon, 381 F. Supp. 911, 913 (E.D. La. 1974),
and in Butler v. Bensinger, 377 F. Supp. 870, 881 (N.D. Ill. 1974). The court in
Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F.2d 978, 981 (1st Cir. 1974), stated that it might consider a
failure to exhaust as a failure to mitigate damages.
335. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1971).
336. See Ziegler & Hermann, Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in
the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 159, 184-85 (1972).
337. See, e.g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
338. The Eighth Circuit, in Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011 (8th Cir. 1974),
described the district court's function as follows:
The district court should simply determine whether the decision was supported
by some facts. The sole and only issue of constitutional substance is whether
there exists any evidence at all, that is, whether there is any basis in fact to
support the action taken by the prison officials ....
Id. at 1018. With the definitive guidelines of minimal due process requirements now set
forth in Wolff, the claims concerning denial of procedural due process in prison
disciplinary hearings should disappear. Accord, Collins v. Vitek, 375 F. Supp. 856,
858 (D.N.H. 1974). But see United States ex rel. Haymes v. Montayne, 505 F.2d 977,
980 n.4 (2d Cir. 1974).
339. Compare King v. Higgins, 370 F. Supp. 1023, 1028 (D. Mass. 1974), and
Pearson v. Townsend, 362 F. Supp. 207, 225 (D.S.C. 1973) (finding a constitutional
violation), with Jones v. Institutional Classification Comm., Field Unit No. 8, 374 F.
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does not attach, the only review will be for arbitrary and capricious
action.
40
Since disciplinary confinements will usually have ended by the time of
trial, most prisoner suits regarding discipline will seek restoration of good
time and damages. In Preiser v. Rodriguez,3 41 the Supreme Court ruled that
suits seeking the restoration of good time were "in the heartland of habeas
corpus" and therefore were to be treated as such rather than under section
1983, with the attendant requirement of exhaustion of state remedies.3 42 The
policy justification for this action was one of federalism; comity dictated that
states be given the first opportunity to correct their own errors. The following
term, Wolff emasculated Preiser by holding that although injunctive relief for
restoration of good time was precluded by Preiser, a prisoner could file suit
under section 1983 for declaratory relief and damages, and use the success-
ful judgment as collateral estoppel in state proceedings for the restoration of
good time.3 43 One circuit court has circumvented the process entirely by
taking the petition for injunctive relief as a pendent claim under state
law.3 44 Further, Wolff held that due process requirements were not retroac-
tive and that therefore pre-Wolff violations gave no right to expungement of
records.3 43 Actions for damages are also precluded unless in violation of an
authoritative and binding pre-Wolff lower court order.A40 Two courts, how-
ever, have held that when the violation is egregious and in bad faith,
expungement and perhaps damages are appropriate.847 Finally, one should
note that a court will not usually order the restoration of good time, but will
instead remand the case to a disciplinary committee for a new hearing.
3 48
Injunctions are useful, however, to obtain discretionary health care. In
several cases the failure of prison authorities to take steps to promote care,
such as a furlough for dental work not available in the prison system,3 49 a
Supp. 706, 712 (W.D. Va. 1974), and Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F. Supp. 1373, 1394
(D. Del. 1974); Almanza v. Oliver, 368 F. Supp. 981, 985 (E.D. Va. 1973) (no con-
stitutional violation).
340. See, e.g., Wesson v. Moore, 365 F. Supp. 1262, 1266-67 (E.D. Va. 1973). See
generally Jordon v. Keve, 387 F. Supp. 765, 770 n.16 (D. Del. 1974).
341. 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973).
342. Id.
343. 418 U.S. at 554-55.
344. See Gregory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1975); accord, Butler v.
Bensinger, 377 F. Supp. 870, 882 (N.D. 111. 1974).
345. 418 U.S. at 573-74.
346. See Cox v. Cook, 420 U.S. 734, 736-37 (1975) (per curiam).
347. See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 212 (8th Cir. 1974);
King v. Higgins, 370 F. Supp. 1023, 1030 (D. Mass. 1974), af 'd, 495 F.2d 815 (1st Cir.
1974).
348. See, e.g., Walker v. Hughes, 375 F. Supp. 708, 717, superseded, 386 F. Supp.
32 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
349. See Bartling v. Ciccone, 376 F. Supp. 200, 203 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
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transfer to a prison in a drier climate for a prisoner suffering from chronic
rhinitis,350 and an absence of salt and fat free diets for heart patients, 351 were
held to be arbitrary and unreasonable, and injunctive relief was granted.
Damages. Recovery for violation of a prisoner's civil rights is rare. A sur-
vey of the federal reporters discloses a total of ten such cases reported in
the last four years,35 2 with a few more granting nominal damages 353 or dam-
ages based upon state law in diversity cases.354 Federal prisoners may sue
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, under which recovery for injuries in-
curred while in prison is somewhat more common than in section 1983
cases.3
55
350. See Ricketts v. Ciccone, 371 F. Supp. 1249, 1256 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
351. See Steward v. Henderson, 364 F. Supp. 283, 285 (N.D. Ga. 1973), in which the
court stated that "[ilt borders on the cruel and unusual to instruct a man that he must
not eat certain foods on peril of damaging his health and then provide him a menu where
the only foods offered are the very ones proscribed." But cf. Carlisle v. Scott, 357 F.
Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
352. United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1975) (recovery
of $1,000 for wrongful solitary confinement without due process protections); Wright v.
McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 129 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972) ($1,500
for 33 days in strip cell); Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971) (prison warden liable for $85,000 damages to inmate shot
in the head by trusty); Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 482 (D. Del. 1974) (two guards
and deputy warden liable for reprisal beating of inmate; $1,500 in consequential and
$1,500 in punitive damages awarded); Jackson v. Allen, 376 F. Supp. 1393, 1396 (E.D.
Ark. 1974) ($1,500 for permanent hand injury incurred in guard beating); United States
ex rel. Bracey v. Grenoble, 356 F. Supp. 673, 675 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 494 F.2d 566
(3d Cir. 1974) ($2,500 for wrongful beating); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292,
1319 (E.D. Va. 1973) (three plaintiffs recovered $15,300, $3,600 and $2,350 respective-
ly for medical damages, pain and suffering, and lost wages while confined in solitary;
court allowed recovery for psychological injury); United States ex rel. Neal v. Wolfe,
346 F. Supp. 569, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ($114 for lost wages and $400 compensatory
damages for 191 days of wrongful segregation); United States ex rel. Motley v.
Rundle, 340 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1972) ($461 for wrongful change in job); Sostre v.
Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 885-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part
sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049,
405 U.S. 978 (1972) ($13,020 for wrongful segregation).
353. See Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14, 18 (W.D. Ky. 1973), modified sub nom.
Ault v. Holmes, 506 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1974); Castor v. Mitchell, 355 F. Supp. 123, 126
(W.D.N.C. 1973); Worley v. Bounds, 355 F. Supp. 115, 122 (W.D.N.C. 1973);
Simmons v. Russell, 352 F. Supp. 572, 580 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
354. See United States ex rel. Fear v. Rundle, 364 F. Supp. 53, 62-63 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
afI'd, 506 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1974) ($20,000 for negligent medical care and permanent
injury).
355. The Act was held applicable to federal prisoners in United States v. Muniz, 374
U.S. 150 (1963). Federal inmates may also recover for injuries incurred in the course of
prison employment under 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1970). The standard under the Act is sim-
ple negligence. See Williams v. United States, 384 F. Supp. 579, 583-84 (D.D.C. 1974);
Byrd v. Warden, 376 F. Supp. 37, 38-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Bourgeois v. United.
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Several legal obstacles stand in the way of the inmate seeking damages.
First, the eleventh amendment bars recovery of money damages from a state
government under section 1983,356 sewing up the deepest pocket available.
Second, section 1983 liability is not coextensive with simple negligence; a
plaintiff must show bad faith on the part of the individual defendant or such
a degree of neglect or arbitrariness that the bad faith and malice of the
defendant may be inferred. 57 A corollary to this principle is that prison
officials are not charged with knowing all of the recent constitutional
decisions delineating the rights of prisoners. They need only show that they
had a good faith belief that their actions were constitutional at the time in
question.3
58
Further difficulty is posed by the doctrine that a government superior is
not liable for the acts of his subordinates unless he has personal knowledge
States, 375 F. Supp. 133, 135 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Brown v. United States, 374 F. Supp.
723, 726 (E.D. Ark. 1974).
356. This is so because a state is not a "person" within the meaning of section 1983,
Myer v. New Jersey, 460 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir. 1972); cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 187-92 (1961), and because a state cannot be sued in federal court by its citi-
zens or by citizens of foreign states by virtue of the eleventh amendment unless it so
consents, see Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899); Gambocz v. Sub-Committee on
Claims of the Joint Legislative Appropriations Comm., New Jersey Legislature, 423
F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1970) (per curiam). See also Pinon v. Wisconsin, 368 F. Supp.
608, 611 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1315-16 (E.D. Va.
1973).
357. Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F.2d 978, 980 (1st Cir. 1974).
358. See Cox v. Cook, 420 U.S. 734 (1975) (per curiam); Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d
598, 601-02 (1st Cir. 1974); Haines v. Kerner, 492 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States ex rel. Lewis v. Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 600, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Fife v. Crist,
380 F. Supp. 901, 911 (D. Mont. 1974); Jackson v. Allen, 376 F. Supp. 1393, 1395-
96 (E.D. Ark. 1974); Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14, 20 (E.D. Ky. 1973), modified,
sub nom. Ault v. Holmes, 506 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1974); Clayborne v. Thompson, 368
F. Supp. 324, 327 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Taylor v. Perini, 365 F. Supp. 557, 558 (N.D.
Ohio 1973); Collins v. Schoonfield, 363 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D. Md. 1973); Poindexter
v. Woodson, 357 F. Supp. 443, 462-63 (D. Kan. 1973), aff'd, 510 F.2d 464 (10th Cir.
1975); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1317 (E.D. Va. 1973).
In Collins, supra, the court characterized the test as follows: "If a prison official
acts in a reasonable good faith reliance on what was standard operating procedure in his
prison, he is not required to respond personally in damages." Id. at 1156. How far this
doctrine extends depends largely on the predilections of the individual judge as to what
is "reasonable." Compare Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 885 (1972), and Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971), with Poindexter v. Woodson, supra. The "standard
operating procedure" has been interpreted to include confinement in an institution under
conditions which are later declared as cruel and unusual punishment. See Brown v.
United States, 342 F. Supp. 987, 993 (E.D. Ark. 1972), a! 'd in part and rev'd in part,
486 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1973). Conversely, an action taken in violation of then-existing
prison policy is forbidden. See United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583,
589 (2d Cir. 1975).
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of them.8 59 A warden or other superior officer can only be held liable in
damages if he had actual knowledge of the tortious conduct of his subordi-
nates and acquiesced in them,360 or if the practice of the prison is so
pervasive that his actual knowledge can be inferred. 61 Another barrier is
that the common law immunity for officials performing their duty also
applies to civil rights actions.8 6 2 A plaintiff must therefore show that the
individual defendant in question was performing a nondiscretionary function,
that is, without policy justification, while committing the tortious act.868
V. THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL INTERVENTION
The large and increasing number of inmate complaints precludes all but
occasional trials of such lawsuits. Indeed, the number of claims rises if a
359. See United States ex rel. Bracey v. Grenoble, 494 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1974);
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973);
Via v. Cliff, 470 F.2d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 1973); Phillips v. Anderson, 386 F. Supp. 371,
374 (E.D. Okla. 1974); Bolden v. Mandel, 385 F. Supp. 761 (D. Md. 1974); Hill v.
Anderson, 381 F. Supp. 906, 908 (E.D. Okla. 1974); Waltenberg v. New York City
Dep't of Correction, 376 F. Supp. 41, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Byrd v. Warden, 376 F. Supp.
37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Mathis v. Pratt, 375 F. Supp. 301, 303 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Black
v. Brown, 355 F. Supp. 925, 926 (N.D. Ill. 1973), ajfd in part and rev'd in part, 513
F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1975).
360. See Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 134-35 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 885 (1972); Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F. Supp. 482, 487 (D. Del. 1975); United
States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 358 F. Supp. 939, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Brown v. United
States, 342 F. Supp. 987, 993 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 486
F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1973).
361. See United States ex rel. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1975)
(inferred from state statutory responsibility); Patterson v. MacDougall, 506 F.2d 1, 4-5
(5th Cir. 1975); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 885 (1972); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302, 1316 (E.D. Va. 1973)
(inferred from the facts of the case).
362. See Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
882 (1974).
363. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971); Barr v. Mateo, 360 U.S. 565 (1959); Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d
820 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974); Byrd v. Warden, 376 F. Supp. 37
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Brown v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 987 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 486 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the subject was made in Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), in which the Court stated:
a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of
government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and re-
sponsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably ap-
peared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is
the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in
light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a
basis for qualified immunity . . . for acts performed in the course of official
conduct.
Id. at 247-48.
Catholic University Law Review
prisoner wins an occasional suit. Recognizing this, the Freund Commission
concluded that " . . .we are, in truth, fostering an illusion. What the
prisoner really has access to is the necessarily fleeting attention of a judge or
law clerk . . . .,364 Judges have repeatedly written that they are unable to
sort out frivolous claims from genuine ones. One court, historically sympa-
thetic to prisoners, complained of "writs" protesting the removal of a pet cat,
a failure to repair a toilet within three days, and the lack of a second set of
clothes. 80 5 Another plaintiff filed 36 different lawsuits in federal court in less
than four years.8
66
Exacerbating the problem of numbers is the lack of effective representa-
tion. Although recent decisions of the Supreme Court have increased the
ability of prisoners to do legal research 07 and thereby assist each other,3 68
the lack of counsel remains a pressing difficulty.30 9 Legal services are not
capable of handling the flow and there is no provision in federal law for
payment of counsel appointed to represent the indigent prisoner.370 Legal
assistance programs using law students as counsel for prisoners have in-
creased rapidly and are now extensive, but aside from the inherent problems
of representation by inexperienced persons, many such programs are allowed
to operate in the prison only by virtue of agreements with prison administra-
tions 'that preclude lawsuits against the prison system itself and confine the
student counsel role to parole hearings, disciplinary hearings, and collateral
legal problems not affecting the prisoner's status within the system.371
364. Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57 F.R.D.
573, 587 (1972).
365. Sparks v. Fuller, 506 F.2d 1238 (1st Cir. 1974). For other examples of this
attitude, see Morales v. Schmidt, 494 F.2d 85, 86 (7th Cir. 1974); Dreyer v. Jalet, 349 F.
Supp. 452, 485 (S.D. Tex. 1972), af!'d per curiam, 479 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1973); Ko-
chie v. Norton, 343 F. Supp. 956, 957 (D. Conn. 1972).
366. See McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (D. Md. 1973).
367. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
368. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
369. See Dreyer v. Jalet, 349 F. Supp. 452, 486 (S.D. Tex. 1972), a!'d mem., 479
F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1973).
370. See Ziegler & Hermann, supra note 336, at 194-95. The Criminal Justice Act §,
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(2)-(3) (1970), provides $250 per case for habeas corpus peti-
tions, absent unusual circumstances, but nothing at all for civil rights actions. By its deci-
sion in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975), the Su-
preme Court precluded recovery of attorney's fees from defendants under a nonstatutory
private attorney general rationale. In a footnote to the opinion, Justice White specifically
disapproved of circuit court decisions such as Souza v. Travisono, 512 F.2d 1137 (1st
Cir. 1975), and Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1974), which granted fees to
prisoners' lawyers to reward them for their public service. 421 U.S. at 270 n.46.
371. See generally Cardielli & Finkelstein, Correctional Administrators Assess the
Adequacy and Impact of Prison Legal Services Programs in the United States, 65 J.
CilM. L.C. & P.S. 91 (1974). An exception to the situation described in the text involves
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A. The Rise of Administrative Remedies
To relieve their burden, courts have encouraged state governments to
develop prisoner grievance procedures so that most complaints can be
handled internally. 72 If the matter cannot be satisfied at that level, then the
courts hope that the record of the grievance system will provide an accurate
basis for summary judgment in a federal court.378 Implicit in this encourage-
ment, and explicit in one case,374 is the promise that once an adequate
system is established, federal courts will require prisoner plaintiffs to com-
plete this route before gaining entry to the federal forum.375
Various prisoner grievance procedures have been inaugurated during the
past four years.878 Largely inspired by Scandinavian ombudsmen systems,
the first was formed in Maryland in 1971 and provides an institutional
grievance officer in each prison, a five-person Inmate Grievance Commission,
two of whose members are from outside the prison system, and an executive
director to investigate complaints. The Commission is authorized to hold
hearings and make recommendations to the state Secretary of Public Safety
and Correctional Services who can either accept, modify, or reject the
proposed order. An appeal of the secretary's order to the state courts is
available. 877 The archetypal system, however, is that of the Federal Bureau
the University of Pennsylvania program, in which students regularly represent prisoners
in federal district courts.
372. See, e.g., Willis v. Ciccone, 506 F.2d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 1974); Finney v.
Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 200 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974); Lunsford v.
Reynolds, 376 F. Supp. 526, 527 (W.D. Va. 1974); Goldsby v. Carries, 365 F. Supp. 395,
397-98 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Dreyer v. Jalet, 349 F. Supp. 452, 490-91 (S.D. Tex. 1972),
a'd per curiam, 479 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1973).
373. See McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191, 1201 (D. Md. 1973); Dreyer v. Jalet,
349 F. Supp. 452, 491 (S.D. Tex. 1972), af 'd per curiam, 479 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir.
1973); Kochie v. Norton, 343 F. Supp. 956, 957 (D. Conn. 1972).
374. McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191, 1210 (D. Md. 1973).
375. See Goldsby v. Carnes, 365 F. Supp. 395, 399 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
376. See T. FITZHARRIS, THE DESIRABILITY OF A CORRECnONAL OMBUDSMAN (1973);
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, PRISON GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES
(1974); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
REPORT ON CORRECTIONS, Standard 2.14 (Grievance Procedure) & Standard 16.2 (Ad-
ministrative Justice) (1973); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, PEACE-
FuL RESOLUTION OF PRISON CONFLICT (1973); Coulson, Justice Behind Bars: Time to
Arbitrate, 59 A.B.A.J. 612 (1973); Denenberg & Denenberg, Prison Grievance Pro-
cedures, 1 CORRECTIONS MAGAZINE 29 (1975); May, Prison Ombudsmen in America,
1 CORRECTIONS MAGAZINE 45 (1975); Singer & Keating, Grievance Mechanisms in
American Corrections: The State of the Art, 1 RESOLUTION, Spring 1975, at 6. Tib-
bles, Ombudsmen for American Prisons, 48 N.D.L. REv. 383 (1972). See also
Report of the National Center for Dispute Settlement to Commissioner of Correc-
tions Frank Hall, Jan. 25, 1974 (copy on file at Harvard Law School Library), which
details the negotiations that took place at MCI, Walpole following the 1973 guard strike.
377. See McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191, 1202-03 (D. Md. 1973).
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of Prisons,8 78 in which complaints are filed with a prison employee who acts
as a grievance officer. The inmate can then appeal his decision to the central
office. 79 Other prisons have inmate advisory councils which make recom-
mendations to the institutional or departmental authorities. Three states have
prison ombudsmen who are independent of correctional authorities.88 0
Several commentators have proposed the development of bargaining groups
and adoption of procedures analogous to labor-management arbitration,1s
but none of the proposals have been implemented.
82
To date there is little data on the progress of the grievance systems. Most
of the literature has come from proponents, and is therefore not to be trusted
fully. 8 8 In its first two years, the Maryland Commission received 923
complaints, held 318 hearings, and granted relief in 103 cases,884 but no
appeals from the Commission have been reported by the higher state courts.
One source states that prisoner complaints in the District Court for the
District of Maryland declined 66 percent between 1971 and 1973,85 but the
opinion of Judge Northrop in McCray v. Burrell18 6 belies this figure.
Elsewhere, a recent article reports that grievance systems have had some
success in reducing overall tensions, smoothing bureaucratic misunderstand-
ings, and making some institutional changes.88 7 The article also noted,
however, that there exist some shortcomings. Most systems are poorly
planned and characterized by a lack of communication, credibility problems,
a shortage of input from the guards, and fear of reprisal by the inmates. 88
None of the systems allow appeal of disciplinary proceedings to grievance
committees, and none repose decisionmaking power outside of the correc-
tional bureaucracy.
History teaches us to be skeptical. Gresham Sykes reports of an inmate
council elected by the prisoners to process complaints and to be consulted
regarding all major nonemergency changes in the prison following the 1952
riots at the New Jersey State Prison at Rahway. Within months of its
378. The Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement establishing the system is reprinted in
Thompson v. United States Fed. Prison Indus., 492 F.2d 1082, 1085-87 (5th Cir. 1974).
379. See generally Singer & Keating, supra note 376, at 8.
380. Id.
381. See, e.g., Coulson, supra note 376, at 613.
382. See Singer & Keating, supra note 376, at 8.
383. See, e.g., T. FITzHARRis, supra note 376; Tibbles, supra note 376.
384. McCray v. Burrell, 367 F. Supp. 1191, 1203 (D. Md. 1973).
385. ABA RESOURCE CENTER ON CORRECTIONAL LAW AND LEGAL SERVICE, MARY-
LAND INMATE GRIEVANCE COMMISSION (1973).
386. 367 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Md. 1973).
387. Singer & Keating, supra note 376, at 6-7.
388. Id. at 7-8.
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inauguration, the council disintegrated and its leaders were transferred to
other prisons. 8 0 Given the lack of final decisionmaking authority in the
recent grievance mechanisms, it would be unrealistic to believe that they can
accomplish the goals the courts have envisioned. 90 Those inmates who view
the courts as a way of getting even with their captors are likely to continue to
file harassing actions after exhausting the administrative remedy. Those
issues on which there is a genuine policy impasse will not be capable of
resolution through administrative complaint. The procedures may be of
substantial help to individuals seeking explanations and as a source of
information about institutional problems, but the history of the "hands off"
era of judicial scrutiny of prison systems indicates that the veil of secrecy
surrounding the prison cannot be successfully lifted without the assistance of
"free world" personnel. To date, only the courts have provided an outside
check on the prison.
B. Systemic Relief: Problems of Implementation
Although class relief for prison problems appears to be the most manage-
able method of bringing the Constitution to the nation's prisons, the available
evidence indicates that correctional systems have been slow to change and
have often flouted court decrees.
Discipline. Only two studies have been conducted since the development
of disciplinary due process. Neither indicates fundamental change from
the Gifis and Kraft studies. The most thorough study was that of the Rhode
Island Adult Correctional Institution in 1972, following the Morris v. Travi-
sono consent decree. 391 The report concluded that the notice of pending
disciplinary charges given to inmates was inadequate and uninformative;
investigation of the charges by superior correctional officials was superficial
and often biased against the inmate; and classification counselors (social
workers) who were charged with representing the inmate before the discipli-
nary board were unable to be vigorous advocates without compromising their
institutional relationships and were therefore perceived as inadequate by the
inmates. The Board itself, composed of senior institutional officials, rarely
engaged in factfinding but usually accepted the testimony of the guards as
389. See G. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 115-20 (1958).
390. Singer & Keating, supra note 376, at 10. The authors state that outside, inde-
pendent review is essential to an effective grievance procedure. The authors envision
grievance systems as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, legal action in the
courts.
391. The study was conducted by the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice. Harvard
Center for Criminal Justice, Judicial Intervention in Prison Discipline, 63 J. CRIM. L.C.
& P.S. 200 (1972).
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true and proceeded to disposition. Review of the Board's findings was
inadequate. The study did find, however, that the extremes of punishment
had diminished, that the hearings were held more promptly, and that the
rules encouraged greater recognition of the rights of inmates in general.8 92
A similar study was conducted at the Matsqui Institution, a medium
security prison in British Columbia.393 Procedures for the Warden's Court
were similar to those at the Adult Correctional Institution. Inmates were to
be given written notice of the charges against them and a summary of the
evidence. This was to be followed by a hearing at which the inmate would
have an opportunity to speak on his own behalf, and the right to call
witnesses, present documentary evidence, and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses. The Warden's Court was also composed of three members of the
institution staff.394 As in Rhode Island, the inmates perceived the Warden's
Court to be a kangaroo court in which they could never win, even if innocent
of the charges.895 The author of the study himself concluded that the
proceedings were unfair, largely because of the biased nature of the pan-
el.396 As for the hearings, he wrote that
four months' observations of the operation of the proceedings
suggest . . . the dominant features of the disciplinary proceedings
were that there was a general presumption of guilt ... a confusion
of the issue of guilt or innocence and -that of appropriate disposi-
tion; a reliance on informal discussion concerning these issues,
much of it based on hearsay and rumor carried on out of the pres-
ence of the inmate accused, and a lack of concern for the uni-
formity of sentences for offenses of a similar nature8 97
The author recommended the introduction of counsel and outside personnel
for the factfinders of the Warden's Court.8 98
Total breakdowns in disciplinary proceedings have occurred elsewhere. In
392. Id. at 222.
393. Jackson, Justice Behind the Walls-A Study of the Disciplinary Process in a
Canadian Penitentiary, 12 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (1974). The study was based upon an
analysis of records of all disciplinary cases from 1968 to 1972, personal observation of
all sessions of the Warden's Court from May to August 1972, and interviews with guards,
staff and inmates. Id. at 3.
394. Id. at 30.
395. Id. at 36.
396. Id. at 36-37, 64, 103.
397. Id. at 31.
398. Id. at 64-70. Of course, it is entirely possible that it was exactly this type of
flexibility that the Supreme Court wished to preserve in Wolff. Indeed, the Court's
emphasis on the rehabilitative role of disciplinary proceedings, the denigration of rules of
evidence, such as the hearsay rule, and the acceptance of prison staff members as
legitimate arbiters, indicates that this sort of result would be entirely acceptable.
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Landman v. Royster,309 Judge Merhige found that 13 months after his
initial decree, prison administrators had failed to explain the order to
subordinates and had been guilty of a "massive failure" to implement the
decision.400 Following a series of disturbances at the Rhode Island Adult
Correctional Institution in April 1973, the warden unilaterally suspended
the Morris v. Travisono rules because they were unworkable and a "hassle
all the way."'401 And four years after it assumed jurisdiction over the Tucker
and Cummins Prison Farms in Arkansas, the Holt court found that the
disciplinary committee established by its order was not working as intend-
ed.
402
Nondisciplinary decrees. Enforcement problems have not been confined
to the disciplinary area. Two years after commencement of Gates v. Col-
lier,40 and a year after entry of the district court's decree, guards at the
Parchman prison went on a rampage, beating scores of inmates, many of
whom were named plaintiffs in the Gates case, plaintiffs in other cases, or
"writ writers. '40 4 A year after entry of its decree in Newman v. Alabama,405
the District Court for the Middle District of Alabama complained of wide-
spread misunderstanding of the order by both inmates and guards, the former
exploiting the victory by constantly threatening suit against the guards, the




Shocked by conditions and stimulated by the epidemic of prison violence
most dramatically displayed by the Attica prison uprising of 1971, federal
courts set out to establish at least minimal standards of living and of fairness
399. 354 F. Supp. 1292, supplemented, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973).
400. Id. at 1297-98.
401. Morris v. Travisono, 373 F. Supp. 177, 179-80 (D.R.I. 1974), aff'd, 509 F.2d
1358 (lst Cir. 1975).
402. Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194, 207 (E.D. Ark. 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part sub nom. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
403. 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972), afI'd, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
404. Lipman, Mississippi's Prison Experience, 45 Miss. L.J. 685, 748 (1974).
In December 1974, Judge Keady ruled that the Mississippi State Penitentiary was in
substantial compliance with constitutional requirements. He noted the replacement of
trusties, the addition of professional staff members of both races, the building of new
facilities and the elimination of racial discrimination. As further relief, he ordered the
hiring of medical personnel and the construction of new housing units. Gates v. Collier,
390 F. Supp. 482, 484-85, 488-89 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
405. 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), remanded mem., 503 F.2d 565 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
406. Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659, 662 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
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in state and federal institutions. Beguiled by such simple standards as the
14 "Practical Proposals" of the Attica rebels, 407 many judges probed deeply
into the life of the prison in an effort to reduce the risk of further violence.
In doing so, they operated on two basic assumptions. First, given traditional
procedural due process protections and the maintenance of minimum stand-
ards of living, inmates would believe that they had been treated fairly,
thereby promoting peace within the institution and facilitating reentry
into the larger society.408 Second, that "the retribution required by law to be
inflicted upon a convict had already . . . been pronounced by a trial court"
made further punishment by prison officials unjustified unless in furtherance
of other legitimate penal objectives.409
Having begun the process of change, the momentum of succeeding
decisions by activist judges such as Motley, Pettine, Zirpoli, and Merhige led
some to the conclusion that the contemporary prison could not be reconciled
with the contemporary Constitution. 410 Unable and unwilling to accept
entirely the precedents of the activists, more conservative members of the
judiciary beat a retreat. 411 The results of the compromise have not been
encouraging. The evidence indicates that bastardized due process produces
results similar to those produced by no process whatsoever. Similarly,
minimal levels of decency toward prisoners may halt the isolated instances of
torture, but violence in prisons remains rampant, and prisoners are no
further along the road to rehabilitation than before.
On the other hand, substantial support exists for the proposition that no
level of due process or constitutional minima would still the voice of protest
407. The proposals included a minimum wage, religious freedom, an end to censor-
ship, parole reform, improved rehabilitation program, attitudinal changes among guards,
better food, better educational programs, medical care, an internal grievance procedure,
more recreational programs and facilities, and an end to punitive segregation. See H.
BADILLO & M. HAYNES, A BILL OF No RIGHTS: ATTICA AND THE AMERICAN PRISON
SYSTEM 56 (1972).
408. See, e.g., Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809, 817 (1974), modified and re-
nanded, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Enomoto v. Clutchette, 95
S. Ct. 2414 (1975); Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1283-84 (1st Cir. 1973).
409. Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292, 1299 (E.D. Va. 1973).
410. See Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 548-54 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd, 489
F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973).
411. See, e.g., the opinion of Judge Rosenn in Braxton v. Carlson, 483 F.2d 933 (3d
Cir. 1973), in which he wrote:
We are apprehensive of the volatile effect such adversarial proceedings could
have on internal prison control and stability. We fear that prisons, by their
very nature packed with intensive emotional problems, would be kept at a
perpetual boiling point by formal adversarial proceedings often involving




from the cell block. Prison riots have occurred as long as prisons have
existed. 412 Criminologists attribute such disturbances not only to the con-
crete complaints of the inmates, but also to the nature of prison society and
to sudden shocks in the established order that lead to instability and
rebellion. 413 Further, one cannot help but feel that the notion of due
process, a component of freedom, and the prison, the totalitarian world
within an otherwise free society, are fundamentally incompatible, and at-
tempts to import the former into the latter are doomed to failure. Such an
intuition is confirmed by experience elsewhere. Despite short prison terms
and comfortable conditions, prisoners in Scandinavia continue to agitate for
prison reform. 414 Indeed, one cannot help but conclude that a contented
prisoner who did not chafe at his bonds would be less than normal.
Still, judicial intervention has been beneficial. The new interest in prisons
on the part of lawyers and others is not likely to collapse quickly. Precedent
holding prison officials accountable for their more egregious actions is firmly
established, and prison life is more visible to the public than before.
412. See H. MATrICK, THE PROSAIC SOURCE OF PRISON VIOLENCE 8 (1972).
413. See, e.g., id. at 8; G. SYKES, supra note 389, at 120-29.
414. Ward, Inmate Rights and Prison Reform in Sweden and Denmark, 63 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 240, 241 (1972).
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